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This dissertation presents research on issues of competition and market
structure in economics, and in particular considers the role of of asymmetric
information in firm competition. This includes asymmetric information among
firms, between firms and regulators and between consumers and firms. In the
course of this I adapt and expand on recently developed methods for solving,
estimating and simulating dynamic models of firm behavior. Finally, this
dissertation focuses attention on firms’ motivations for and the consequences of
horizontal expansion, both in the form of horizontal mergers in a differentiated
goods market and in the form of horizontal chain affiliation.
This research proceeds in three steps. In Chapter 2 I explore and doc-
ument consumers growing ability to use new online reputation mechanisms to
both share their experiences with a wide variety of firms and gain information
from other consumers’ shared experiences. In Chapter 3 I present a theoretical
model of horizontal mergers in a dynamic industry setting. I use this model to
iv
answer a question that increasingly interests antitrust policymakers concerned
with innovation: In a concentrated industry, does allowing rival firms to merge
increase or decrease total investment? This model has two important features.
First, the environment is fully dynamic, and second, I allow mergers to occur
endogenously.
In Chapter 4, I combine many of the concepts from Chapters 2 and
3 into on piece of research to address the question: why do firms organize
into chains? I use of combination of reduced form and structural dynamic
methods to examine possible answers to this question in the context of the
hotel industry. In particular, I take advantage of recent advances in estimating
dynamic industry models to show that there is no evidence in favor of the
traditional explanation for horizontal expansion, economies of scale or cost
efficiencies. Instead, using a detailed examination of hotel revenue along with
firm and market data, I show that chain firms have a substantial demand
side advantage resulting from the fact that consumers frequently have little
information on firm quality. In this industry, then, asymmetric information
seems to not only matter for chain affiliation, it is the only factor that matters.
v
Table of Contents
Abstract iv
List of Tables viii
List of Figures x
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Online Reviews in the Hotel Industry 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Number and Presence of Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2 Number of Reviews by Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.3 Mean Rating and Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Ratings and Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Chapter 3. Horizontal Mergers and Innovation in Concentrated
Industries 25
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1 Incumbent Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.2 Merger Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2.3 Potential Entrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Equilibrium and Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4.1 Model Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4.2 Mergers and Innovation Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
vi
3.5.1 Multiproduct Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5.2 Optimal Antitrust Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Chapter 4. The Spread of Horizontal Chains: Efficiency or Mar-
ket Power? 49
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Revenue Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2.2 Revenue Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.3 Switchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2.4 Sources of Chain Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 Recovering Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.3.1 Revenue Adjustments: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.3.2 Policy Functions: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3.3.3 Value Function Inversion: . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.4.1 Expectation Step: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.4.2 Maximization Step: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.1 Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Bibliography 114
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Market Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Proportion of Firms with Online Presence . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Probability of Having Online Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Number of Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Average Number of Reviews per Firm by Market Type . . . . 14
2.6 Number of Reviews by Reviewer Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7 Number of Ratings by Rating Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.8 Mean Online Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.9 Standard Deviation of Ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.10 Correlations Between Ratings and Firm Revenue . . . . . . . . 22
2.11 Review Summary Statistics by Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.12 Conditional Reviews Summaries by Chain . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Base Parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 Comparison of equilibrium with and without mergers . . . . . 44
3.3 Comparison of policies at merger states . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1 Market Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2 Hotel Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3 Revenue Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4 Full Revenue Estimates with Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5 Revenue Effects of Adding or Dropping Affiliation . . . . . . . 103
4.6 Chain Only Revenue Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.7 Hotel Reviews Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.8 Estimated Slope of Reviews*Firm Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.9 Incumbent Firm’s Policy Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.10 Poisson Entry Probability by Firm Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.11 Estimated Operating Costs ($ per room per day) . . . . . . . 109
viii
4.12 Estimates Using Different First Stage Specifications . . . . . . 110
4.13 STR Operating Costs ($ per room per day) . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.14 Cost Estimates ($ per room per day) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.15 Comparison of Model Simulations to Data . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.16 Counterfactual Firm Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
ix
List of Figures
2.1 Distribution of Ratings by Firm Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1 Marginal Distribution of Merging Firms in Data . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Marginal Distribution of Merging Firms in Model . . . . . . . 42
3.3 Firm Investment Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4 Inverse-U Relationship in Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 The Spread of Chain Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Independent and Chain Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3 Chain Premium (%) Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Chain Premium Before and After Switching . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 Distribution of Ratings by Firm Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.6 Chain Premium, truncated by # Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.7 Growth of Chains in Rural Texas Hotels . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.8 Excluded Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.9 Selected Market Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation presents research on issues of competition and market
structure in economics, and in particular considers the role of of asymmet-
ric information in firm competition. This includes asymmetric information
among firms, between firms and regulators and between consumers and firms.
In the course of this I adapt and expand on recently developed methods for
solving, estimating and simulating dynamic models of firm behavior. Almost
all questions involving competition and market structure have important dy-
namic implications and without considering these we might frequently reach
the wrong conclusions. Finally, this dissertation focuses particular attention
on firms’ motivations for and the consequences of horizontal expansion, both
in the form of horizontal mergers in a differentiated goods market and in the
form of horizontal chain affiliation.
In Chapter 2 I explore and document consumers growing ability to use
new online reputation mechanisms to both share their experiences with a wide
variety of firms and gain information from other consumers’ shared experi-
ences. These resources, such as Yelp.com and TripAdvisor.com, are having a
potentially dramatic impact on the informational environment in which firms
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compete. Nowhere is this more true than in the hotel industry. Due to low re-
peat business, this is an industry that had been characterized by unusually low
consumer information. Over the past decade, however, websites like TripAd-
visor.com and Hotels.com have allowed consumers access to detailed reviews
and ratings, with these ratings typically displayed at the point of sale. To
the extent that these online reputation mechanisms matter for competition,
we might expect to see it first in this industry. While I cannot at this time
consider a causal relationship between online reviews and firm performance
due to unobserved firm characteristics, in this chapter I do show several corre-
lation results. Chain and high quality firms are more likely to be reviewed and
to have high numbers of reviews, but being reviewed is not associated with
higher revenue. Higher mean ratings are strongly associated with higher rev-
enue, however, and rating standard deviation is strongly negatively correlated
with revenue.
In Chapter 3 I present a theoretical model of horizontal mergers in a dy-
namic industry setting. I use this model to answer a question that increasingly
interests antitrust policymakers concerned with innovation: In a concentrated
industry, does allowing rival firms to merge increase or decrease total invest-
ment? This model has two important features. First, the environment is fully
dynamic, every period each firm makes decisions about entry, exit, investment
and mergers. Because the research question is inherently dynamic, considering
entry and investment behaviors, only a dynamic industry model can be used to
examine them. Second, I allow mergers to occur endogenously, as opposed to
2
examining the impact of exogenously conducted mergers as most of the prior
literature does. Methodologically, solving this sort of model is very difficult,
which is why very little prior research has included these elements.
Two opposing economic forces make this an interesting question. As
large firms buy out smaller competitors, they improve their product quality,
and thus might use mergers as a substitute for investment, lowering total
investment in the industry. On the other hand, the windfall gain that comes
from getting bought out creates a powerful incentive for new entry and for
investment by small firms to make themselves an attractive merger partner.
Ultimately, I find this second force typically outweighs the first and allowing
mergers results in more investment and more innovation than restricting them.
This model can eventually be used to solve for the optimal antitrust policy of
a regulator with imperfect information on the state of the market and of the
firms attempting to merge.
In Chapter 4, I combine many of the concepts from Chapters 2 and 3
into on piece of research to address the question: why do firms organize into
chains? The spread of the horizontal chain model, where many firms operate
under one banner and offer uniform goods or services, is well documented. I
use of combination of reduced form and structural dynamic methods to exam-
ine possible answers to this question in the context of the hotel industry. In
particular, I take advantage of recent advances in estimating dynamic industry
models to show that there is no evidence in favor of the traditional explanation
for horizontal expansion, economies of scale or cost efficiencies. Instead, us-
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ing a detailed examination of hotel revenue along with firm and market data,
including online reviews data, I show that chain firms have a substantial de-
mand side advantage resulting from the fact that consumers frequently have
little information on firm quality and value the quality signal a chain affiliation
provides.
In particular, I show chains earn a revenue premium of over 20% and
that this premium is consistent with the predictions of a model of low con-
sumer information and not consistent with other potential explanations. This
premium has also declined substantially over the years 2000-2012 as online
reputation sites have proliferated, and disappears when only considering firms
with a large number of online reviews. In addition, I solve and simulate a
dynamic industry model using estimated profit parameters to consider the dy-
namic implications of policies that restrict the activities of chain firms. Along
with being one of the first papers to estimate a dynamic model of firm competi-
tion with flexibly specified unobserved market level heterogeneity, this research
presents and supports a new explanation for a large economic phenomenon,
the spread of chains, that has attracted attention from economists and poli-
cymakers in a variety of fields.
This dissertation documents the changing nature of information avail-
able to consumers and explores expands on methods for fully considering the
dynamic aspects of competition and market structure issues ranging from tra-
ditional horizontal mergers to estimating and simulating a model of horizontal
chain affiliation.
4
Chapter 2
Online Reviews in the Hotel Industry
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, consumers have increasingly been able to share
and document their experiences with a wide variety of firms. Other consumers
have access to these reviews and ratings and can use them when making their
own decisions. This spread of information has potentially dramatic impli-
cations on firm performance and conduct. In particular, it raises a number
of questions of interest in economics and marketing. What impact do these
reviews, their total number, average rating, variance of ratings, etc, have on
firm profits? What firm characteristics are associated with generating different
types of reviews?
The goal of this paper is to collect and document data on consumer
reviews in the hotel industry and to answer these questions in that context. I
combine data on hotel level revenue of all the hotels in the state of Texas from
2000-2012 with reviews data from TripAdvisor.com, the world’s largest travel
review site, as well as additional data on firm and market characteristics.
A number of previous studies have examined the topic of online reviews
as they relate to product quality and firm performance. [44] forms a theoret-
5
ical model of review variance and how it interacts with product quality and
consumer tastes and then tests this model with critic review data and box
office performance as well as Amazon book sales. In particular, they find that
a high variance should and does increase revenue for low quality products and
decrease it for high quality products.
[14] studies the impact of reviews on sales in the book industry by
comparing sales on Amazon and Barnes and Noble, finding that that reviews
impact sales, with negative reviews having a strong impact than positive re-
views. [49] study video game data and find the effect of reviews on sales
depends on both consumer and product characteristics, with larger effects for
less popular games and more experienced users. [20] use a panel of data to
test for causality between movie reviews and box office performance. They
find reviews reflect unobserved quality differences and do not influence sales.
Two papers, [25] and [18], use detailed data on user reviews for hotels and
consumer behavior to discuss optimal rankings by travel sites.
2.2 Data
The state of Texas collects a special hotel occupancy tax. Consequently,
the full quarterly revenues of all Texas lodging establishments is available from
the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. Tax revenue data is particularly
trustworthy because incorrectly reporting it is considered unlawful tax evasion.
For each hotel I also collect location, capacity and a measure of age. This
information, along with chain affiliation, was cross checked with a number
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of sources including the AAA Tourbook and various hotels booking websites.
The AAA Tourbook also provides us with a standardized measure of quality,
giving a rating of 1 through 4 stars for each hotel listed. Of the hotels in our
sample, 57% of affiliated firms have been rated. As AAA does not rate firms
below a minimum quality standard, unrated firms are assigned a score of 1
star. My analysis focuses on rural markets, in which the bulk of hotels are
one or two stars. The full distribution of star ratings breaks down as follows:
52.9% one star or unrated, 28.9% two stars, 17.9% three stars, and 0.2% four
stars.
I also collect data from TripAdvisor.com, the world’s largest travel re-
view website. TripAdvisor.com was until recently a subsidiary of Expedia.com,
along with Hotels.com and Hotwire.com. Users rate firms on a 5 star scale and
leave detailed reviews. The data is a December 2012 cross-section containing
average user rating, the number and distribution of reviews, each firm’s rank-
ing within their market, and the number of reviews by reviewer type (business,
family, etc.) I also calculate the standard deviation of user ratings from the
ratings distribution.
The analysis here is largely restricted to rural markets, where a market
is defined as rural if there is no other market within 20 miles of it.1 This is for
1For all results that follow, I define market as nearest city but also include firms in
the same county among potential competitors. In addition, because hotel customers are
frequently highway travellers, there is still potential substitution across markets. As a
result, for markets on major highways I test inclusion of the firms in adjacent counties as
potential competitors. I find that including them has no significant effect on results.
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several reasons. Large cities and their suburbs contain a very large number
of hotels. These hotels are more horizontally differentiated in a number of
unobservable ways, some cater to business travelers, others to recreational,
and within a large, sprawling city such as Houston, location is a key concern.
It is not necessarily clear, therefore, which firms are competing with whom,
and thus how to define a market, and there is probably a large degree of
unobserved heterogeneity. Fortunately, Texas contains a great many rural
and isolated markets. After restricting attention to these markets, our sample
contains 353 markets with 1465 hotels. The mean market had 2.22 chain and
2.77 independent hotels active in 2012.
Table 2.1: Market Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max
County Firms
Chains 4.24 3.76 0 19
Independents 4.15 3.41 0 17
Market Characteristics
Daily Traffic 14,289 13,756 0 100,000
Population 20,130 279,734 880 423,970
Total Sales ($billion) 3.41 20.6 0.03 438
Gas Wells 326.6 737.3 0 6155
Oil Wells 461.9 843,5 0 8261
Unemployment 5.72 2.27 1.9 17.8
Note: This table presents summary statistics on market charac-
teristics, where market refers to county.
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To account for demand side factors that influence firm revenue and
market structure, I collect a variety of data on each market. From the Census
Bureau I collect data on county unemployment rate and population, and total
county retail sales as measures of market size or business activity. From the
Texas Railroad Commission I add data on the number of currently producing
wells for both oil and natural gas in each county. I also gather Texas De-
partment of Transportation data on average daily traffic passing through each
market. This measure is a key determinant of demand in the rural roadside
hotel industry. Summary statistics on these data can be seen in Table 4.1.
Together, variation across time and markets in these factors should help cap-
ture exogenous shifts in demand. In particular, the growth of the natural gas
industry in Texas over the past decade has had a significant impact on hotel
demand and is clear exogenous to hotel performance.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Number and Presence of Reviews
In this section, I summarize results on the number of reviews hotels
receive on TripAdvisor.com. Reviews data comes from a 2012 cross-section. I
consider the total number of reviews firms receive as well as the total by re-
viewer type and review type. First, I show results on the probability of being
reviewed on TripAdvisor.com at all. Of 1, 329 firms active in 2012, only 817
have one or more review. There is no fee associated with gaining a listing on
TripAdvisor but the individual firm must submit information including average
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prices. It is notable how many firms have no online presence on TripAdvisor,
the world’s largest travel information site. Table 2.3.1 shows the unconditional
probabilities of being reviewed online. Chain affiliated firms are significantly
more likely to be reviewed. This could be a result of higher demand, different
customer base, or a chain policy of forming an online presence. Of the unre-
viewed firms, roughly 81% operate independently. In addition, roughly 78%
of unreviewed hotels are 1 star hotels.
Table 2.2: Proportion of Firms with Online
Presence
AAA Rating ? ?? ? ? ?
Chain 62.20% 82.64% 88.96%
Independent 34.02% 59.87% 71.65%
Table 2.3 shows a logistic regression on whether or not a firm has online
reviews. Again we see chain firms are more likely to be reviewed. Conditional
on chain affiliation or lack thereof, higher quality firms are more likely to have
online reviews. Number of reviews is also positively correlated with being
reviewed online. Among market characteristics, only traffic levels are positively
associated with the likelihood of being reviewed, with county revenue being
negatively correlated.
Table 2.4 shows results of a regression of number of reviews on firm
and market characteristics, with and without market level fixed effects. Here,
market is defined at the county level. A few results stand out. When market
level factors are completely controlled for, we see chain firms have significantly
10
Table 2.3: Probability of Having Online Reviews
Firm Characteristics
Chain 1.164***
(0.211)
2 Stars 1.062***
(0.212)
3 Stars 1.589***
(0.270)
Age 0.0139
(0.00875)
Log Capacity 1.192***
(0.180)
Firm Characteristics
Log County Revenue -0.199*
(0.0939)
Log Traffic 0.253**
(0.0967)
Unemployment -0.0430
(0.0436)
Log Population 0.0121
(0.115)
Log Gas Wells -0.0110
(0.0306)
Log Oil Wells -0.0264
(0.0298)
cons -3.316*
(1.301)
N 1329
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable is one if a firm has a positive numbers of reviews.
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Table 2.4: Number of Reviews
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Firms All Firms Reviewed Firms Reviewed Firms
Firm Characteristics
Chain 3.157 4.750** 1.102 3.158
(1.758) (1.800) (2.300) (2.449)
2 Star 3.571* 2.431 0.826 -0.0803
(1.772) (1.802) (2.354) (2.467)
3 Star 11.30*** 8.950*** 6.624* 5.380
(2.002) (2.047) (2.651) (2.803)
4 Star 44.07*** 267.0*** 257.1*** 263.1***
(9.953) (18.77) (21.08) (22.39)
Age -0.0541 -0.214** -0.297** -0.411***
(0.0686) (0.0734) (0.111) (0.120)
Log Capacity 9.472*** 7.673*** 10.30*** 6.863**
(1.342) (1.425) (1.945) (2.202)
Market Characteristics
Log County Revenue -1.562* -2.342*
(0.705) (1.029)
Log Traffic -0.773 -2.970**
(0.728) (1.069)
Unemployment -1.025** -1.405**
(0.327) (0.479)
Log Population 1.712* 3.120*
(0.861) (1.247)
Log Oil Wells -0.911*** -1.404***
(0.217) (0.296)
Log Gas Wells -0.491* -0.929**
(0.222) (0.307)
Market Dummies No Yes No Yes
cons 5.090 -21.25*** 41.72** -7.851
(9.823) (5.398) (14.43) (8.750)
N 1333 1333 818 818
adj. R2 0.210 0.086 0.282 0.032
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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more reviews than independent firm. In addition, higher quality firms, par-
ticularly 3 and 4 star firms have significantly more reviews. Notably, these
results for 3 star and chain firms are no longer significant when only look-
ing at reviewed firms. This implies their higher number of reviews is coming
through the extensive margin and not the intensive margin. This is confirmed
in Table 2.3.
We also see that older firms have slightly fewer reviews than new firms
and having more rooms is associated with significantly more reviews. Surpris-
ingly, while traffic is associated with a higher probability of being reviewed,
among reviewed firms traffic is negatively correlated with number of reviews.
Number of reviews is negatively correlated with the number of active gas wells,
oil wells, and county revenue, as well as the unemployment rate in 2012.
2.3.2 Number of Reviews by Type
TripAdvisor.com requires users to specify the type of traveler they are
when leaving a review. These categories are business, solo, couple or family.
In Table 2.6 I present results on the number of reviews by reviewer type. A
few points stand out. First, chain firms have significantly more reviews from
business travelers as well as solo travelers. 3 Star hotels and larger hotels
generate more reviews of each type, but these correlations are weakest for solo
travelers. 4 Star hotels receive significant numbers of reviews from families
and couples, but not solo or business travelers.
Unlike AAA ratings, which are formed using a standard criteria giving
13
Table 2.5: Average Number of Reviews per Firm by Market Type
Log Population 2.106***
(0.542)
Log Traffic 1.295**
(0.438)
Unemployment -1.414***
(0.208)
Log County Revenue -1.587***
(0.446)
Log Gas Wells -0.161
(0.139)
Log Oil Wells -1.100***
(0.140)
Water Adjacent 1.070
(0.721)
Border Adjacent 0.497
(1.403)
cons 25.30***
(5.857)
N 1333
adj. R2 0.098
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 2.6: Number of Reviews by Reviewer Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business Family Solo Couple
Firm Characteristics
Chain 1.222** 1.095 0.744*** 0.100
(0.384) (0.618) (0.167) (0.567)
2 Star 0.632 0.943 0.388* 0.997
(0.387) (0.623) (0.169) (0.571)
3 Star 2.915*** 3.809*** 0.949*** 2.363***
(0.437) (0.704) (0.191) (0.646)
4 Star 3.247 25.51*** -0.296 13.51***
(2.174) (3.498) (0.947) (3.209)
Age -0.0189 -0.0272 0.00530 -0.0101
(0.0150) (0.0241) (0.00653) (0.0221)
Log Capacity 2.004*** 2.648*** 0.574*** 2.467***
(0.293) (0.472) (0.128) (0.433)
Market Characteristics
Log County Revenue -0.150 -0.244 -0.0742 -0.563*
(0.154) (0.248) (0.0672) (0.227)
Log Traffic -0.00146 -0.135 0.0956 -0.320
(0.159) (0.256) (0.0693) (0.235)
Unemployment -0.0774 -0.292* -0.0699* -0.333**
(0.0715) (0.115) (0.0312) (0.106)
Log Population 0.217 0.408 0.00570 0.475
(0.188) (0.302) (0.0819) (0.278)
Log Gas Wells -0.0444 -0.150 -0.0408 -0.170*
(0.0485) (0.0780) (0.0211) (0.0716)
Log Oil Wells -0.00844 -0.235** -0.0792*** -0.338***
(0.0473) (0.0761) (0.0206) (0.0699)
cons -4.868* -2.592 -0.285 6.520*
(2.146) (3.452) (0.935) (3.168)
N 1333 1333 1333 1333
adj. R2 0.240 0.200 0.197 0.128
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 2.7: Number of Ratings by Rating Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Stars 2 Stars 3 Stars 4 Stars 5 Stars
Firm Characteristics
Chain 0.446 0.0836 0.374 0.724 1.546
(0.259) (0.185) (0.220) (0.422) (1.183)
2 Star 0.780** 0.465* 0.878*** 1.114** 0.331
(0.261) (0.186) (0.222) (0.426) (1.193)
3 Star -0.421 0.467* 1.005*** 3.089*** 7.160***
(0.295) (0.210) (0.251) (0.481) (1.348)
4 Star 2.883* 7.439*** 5.656*** 12.15*** 15.93*
(1.467) (1.045) (1.247) (2.391) (6.699)
Age 0.0413*** 0.0218** 0.0232** -0.00484 -0.136**
(0.0101) (0.00721) (0.00860) (0.0165) (0.0462)
Log Capacity 1.861*** 1.162*** 1.218*** 1.955*** 3.277***
(0.198) (0.141) (0.168) (0.322) (0.903)
Market Characteristics
Log County Revenue -0.210* -0.138 -0.133 -0.228 -0.855
(0.104) (0.0741) (0.0884) (0.169) (0.475)
Log Traffic -0.0774 -0.154* -0.106 -0.0930 -0.347
(0.107) (0.0765) (0.0912) (0.175) (0.490)
Unemployment -0.155** -0.114*** -0.166*** -0.236** -0.352
(0.0483) (0.0344) (0.0410) (0.0787) (0.220)
Log Population 0.299* 0.192* 0.0749 0.142 1.006
(0.127) (0.0904) (0.108) (0.207) (0.579)
Log Gas Wells -0.0995** -0.0539* -0.0645* -0.144** -0.131
(0.0327) (0.0233) (0.0278) (0.0533) (0.149)
Log Oil Wells 0.0286 -0.0622** -0.141*** -0.257*** -0.478**
(0.0319) (0.0228) (0.0271) (0.0520) (0.146)
cons -3.209* -0.567 0.651 1.245 7.022
(1.448) (1.032) (1.231) (2.360) (6.612)
N 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333
adj. R2 0.140 0.161 0.189 0.217 0.139
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
them a close to objective measure of quality, online ratings are inherently
subjective. Customers rate three and four star hotels differently than one star
hotels based on their prior expectations about quality. Price paid and the
customer’s sense of “value” received also play a role. In addition, particularly
positive and negative experiences are more likely to result in reviews, relative
to average ones. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of reviews by number of
firms for each firm type, where a firm type is number of stars and whether it
is affiliated with a chain or operates independently.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Ratings by Firm Type
Note: This figure shows histograms of consumer ratings on TripAdvisor.com separated by
firm type, where firm type is either chain or independent, and stars refer to AAA quality
ratings.
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In Table 2.7 I present results on the number of ratings received by hotels
by rating type, on a 1 to 5 star scale. There is a general pattern linking quality
as measured by AAA star ratings and TripAdvisor ratings. 2 star hotels are
more likely than 1 star hotels to receive ratings of all types except 5 stars. 3
star hotels are more likely to receive high quality user ratings and less likely
to receive low user ratings. Older hotels are more likely to receive low user
ratings and less likely to receive high ones.
2.3.3 Mean Rating and Variance
In this section, I present correlations between firm and market charac-
teristics, average firm-level online ratings and the standard deviations of these
ratings. Results on average user ratings are presented in Table ??. We see
that chain firms are more likely to receive high user ratings, having roughly
11% higher ratings on average. Similarly, three star firms have 23% higher rat-
ings than one star firms on average. Older firms and those with more rooms
are more likely to receive low user ratings. The only market characteristic
correlated with average rating is the number of oil wells, which is negatively
associated with ratings.
I also consider correlations between firm and market characteristic and
the average standard deviation of user ratings. Results are in Table ??. The
primary result is that firms with lower average ratings have lower standard
deviations in their user ratings. After accounting for mean rating, the only
significant predictor of rating variance is number of rooms, which is negatively
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Table 2.8: Mean Online Rating
(1) (2)
Log Mean Rating Log Mean Rating
Firm Characteristics
Chain 0.108** 0.112**
(3.12) (2.85)
2 Stars 0.0453 0.0420
(1.28) (1.06)
3 Stars 0.208*** 0.229***
(5.22) (5.10)
4 Stars 0.534 0.506
(1.68) (1.41)
Age -0.0117*** -0.0112***
(-7.01) (-5.83)
Log Capacity -0.0911** -0.0791*
(-3.11) (-2.24)
Market Characteristics
Log County Revenue -0.0227
(-1.47)
Log Traffic -0.0221
(-1.38)
Unemployment 0.00803
(1.11)
Log Population 0.0247
(1.31)
Log Gas Wells 0.00789
(1.71)
Log Oil Wells -0.0233***
(-5.24)
cons 1.954*** 1.444***
(9.00) (10.28)
N 818 818
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 2.9: Standard Deviation of Ratings
(1) (2)
Firm Characteristics
type -0.0576 -0.125
(0.0579) (0.0637)
2.rating -0.00494 0.0386
(0.0593) (0.0635)
3.rating -0.101 -0.000779
(0.0688) (0.0747)
4.rating -0.829 -1.049
(0.518) (0.562)
age 0.00150 0.00499
(0.00287) (0.00317)
lcap -0.253*** -0.224***
(0.0491) (0.0567)
urating -0.293*** -0.291***
(0.0228) (0.0253)
Market Characteristics
ls 0.0226
(0.0258)
ltraf 0.0238
(0.0265)
unemp 0.0333**
(0.0119)
lpop -0.0313
(0.0310)
gaswells 0.0173*
(0.00762)
oilwells 0.0155*
(0.00747)
cons 0.146 0.700**
(0.379) (0.252)
N 790 790
adj. R2 0.313 0.085
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
correlated with rating standard deviation.
2.4 Ratings and Revenue
In this section I examine the relationship between online ratings and
firm revenue. As discussed above, a number of previous studies have found
relationships between online ratings and sales in the book, movie and restau-
rant industries. Despite the prominence of user reviews at the point of sale in
the travel industry, this issue has received less attention in this context.
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Here I present correlations between the number of reviews, average
rating, and other measures and individual hotel level performance. While
firm revenues come from a panel the reviews data consist of a December 2012
cross-section. Therefore it is impossible to eliminate concerns about firm level
unobserved heterogeneity. It could be the case, for instance, that a hotel has
high user ratings and high revenues due to its high quantity not captured by
the AAA star ratings and not due to a causal relationship between online
rating and user demand.
The measure of performance I will focus on is daily revenue per available
room, or “RevPar”. This is the industry standard and is computed simply as
total revenue divided by capacity and the number of days in the tax reporting
period. I use the annual mean for 2012. Table 2.10 presents results of a set
of regressions of firm average revpar on firm characteristics, including online
ratings summaries. In column 1, I include a variable indicating whether or
not a firm has reviews on TripAdvisor.com at all. Notably, having online
reviews is not associated with higher revenue after controlling for other firm
characteristics.
For each other column, I only use the set of reviewed firms. In column
2 we see a strong positive correlation between average user rating and revenue.
Here a one star increase on TripAdvisor’s five star scale is associated with a
roughly $6 per room per day increase in revenue, a roughly 30% gain.
In column 3, I include the standard deviation of user ratings. While
controlling for mean rating we see a strong and large negative correlation
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Table 2.10: Correlations Between Ratings and Firm Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
type 5.331 8.212*** 8.151*** 9.113*** 7.979*** 7.983***
(2.896) (2.048) (2.028) (2.114) (2.029) (2.019)
2.rating 5.726* 4.521* 4.046* 5.378* 4.621* 4.228*
(2.889) (2.058) (2.042) (2.126) (2.038) (2.032)
3.rating 22.01*** 15.55*** 14.90*** 19.16*** 15.38*** 14.91***
(3.265) (2.397) (2.380) (2.423) (2.374) (2.368)
4.rating 36.61 52.08** 49.39** 12.07 20.32 25.22
(29.57) (18.69) (18.52) (21.38) (20.50) (20.47)
age -0.615*** -0.546*** -0.529*** -0.684*** -0.517*** -0.511***
(0.116) (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.102) (0.102)
lcap 3.499 -2.898 -3.695* -5.926** -3.940* -4.333*
(2.306) (1.846) (1.841) (1.913) (1.851) (1.847)
posrev 1.577
(2.420)
urating 6.626*** 6.019*** 5.916*** 5.598***
(0.774) (0.785) (0.792) (0.796)
revstd -12.17*** -9.514**
(3.367) (3.490)
numreviews 0.189*** 0.125*** 0.0972**
(0.0350) (0.0346) (0.0359)
cons 18.81* 21.43** 31.07*** 51.98*** 25.52** 32.15***
(8.585) (8.044) (8.399) (7.546) (8.046) (8.365)
N 1333 818 818 818 818 818
adj. R2 -0.031 0.320 0.333 0.273 0.333 0.340
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
between rating standard deviation and revenue. This suggests consumers may
be averse to uncertainty when choosing a hotel, preferring a firm with all 3
star ratings to one with a mix of 1 and 5 star reviews.
Finally, number of reviews is positively correlated with revenue, even
when controlling for mean and standard deviation of ratings, although this
could simply reflect unobserved demand conditions.
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Table 2.11: Review Summary Statistics by Chain
(1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of Hotels Mean Reviews Reviews per Room Mean Rating Rating Std Dev. Business Share 5 Star Share 1 Star Share
Best Western 143 14.73 0.267 3.255 0.295 0.245 0.380 0.121
Holiday Inn Express 93 19.82 0.295 3.435 0.238 0.323 0.454 0.0774
Comfort Inn 56 18.96 0.312 3.589 0.261 0.290 0.483 0.0967
La Quinta 54 35.37 0.499 3.944 0.200 0.232 0.505 0.0863
Days Inn 52 14.27 0.269 2.375 0.285 0.222 0.218 0.345
Super 8 50 15.84 0.334 2.950 0.275 0.209 0.261 0.165
Hampton Inn 49 30.10 0.420 4.041 0.194 0.301 0.567 0.0472
America’s Best Value Inn 35 8.886 0.200 2.443 0.364 0.244 0.286 0.325
Motel 6 28 10.93 0.169 2.732 0.373 0.170 0.167 0.321
Econolodge 21 9.238 0.171 2.190 0.274 0.247 0.209 0.303
Regency Inn 20 2.250 0.0811 0.875 0.134 0.171 0.258 0.392
Quality Inn 16 22.62 0.364 2.875 0.241 0.186 0.273 0.221
Ramada Inn 13 29.23 0.388 3.346 0.278 0.287 0.406 0.177
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Table 2.12: Conditional Reviews Summaries by Chain
(1) (1) (2) (3)
Hotels Mean Reviews Mean Rating Rating Std Dev
Best Western 143 5.624 2.951 0.302
Holiday Inn Express 93 7.184 2.870 0.249
Comfort Inn 56 8.600 3.117 0.270
La Quinta 54 23.25 3.343 0.203
Days Inn 52 6.902 2.266 0.288
Super 8 50 10.05 2.896 0.277
Hampton Inn 49 16.84 3.417 0.201
America’s Best Value Inn 35 3.643 2.519 0.379
Motel 6 28 4.256 3.198 0.422
Econolodge 21 3.258 2.077 0.278
Regency Inn 20 0.0525 1.157 0.174
Quality Inn 16 12.04 2.510 0.232
Ramada Inn 13 19.52 3.084 0.260
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Chapter 3
Horizontal Mergers and Innovation in
Concentrated Industries
3.1 Introduction
In a concentrated industry, does allowing rival firms to merge increase
or decrease total investment? Antitrust authorities increasingly deal with in-
dustries, particularly in technological fields, characterized by high levels of
investment and rapid changes in firm market share resulting from innovations
produced by this investment. For these industries, the effects of a merger on
dynamic considerations such as investment, entry and exit are large relative
to standard considerations of price increases when determining the merger’s
likely effect on consumer welfare. Nevertheless, economic theory offers lit-
tle guidance on the relationship between horizontal mergers and incentives
to innovate. This reflects a number of challenges, both methodological and
conceptual, which this paper works to overcome.
A merger between rival firms will affect their investment incentives
in several ways. Investment typically imposes a negative externality on the
industry, as some portion of the gains from a successful innovation come from
stealing business from rival firms. By merging, firms will internalize this effect
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and reduce their investment accordingly. Firms may also buy out a smaller
rival to acquire its new innovation, and so use the merger as a substitute
for investing in the new technology itself. On the other hand, a merger may
increase the new firm’s ability to innovate by taking advantage of economies
of scale or complementarities between the two firms’ R&D departments. The
prospect of being bought out may also encourage entry into the market by new
firms, encouraging development of new products and technologies. If a firm
buys out another and subsequently keeps both products on the market, the
negative pricing externality between the two products is removed and the firm
captures a larger share of the surplus generated by a successful innovation. Its
not clear which of these effects will dominate without a model of mergers in a
dynamic industry setting.
Simply observing whether investment increases or decreases post-merger
in the data is potentially biased. The merger itself could be a response to some
larger shock to technology, preferences or regulations that would cause firms
or the entire industry to expand or contract in the absence of a merger. More
generally, testing levels of investment post-merger empirically would typically
rely on a test statistic that assumes independent observations, but a merger
is not a random event. Mergers strongly cluster over time and industries, and
both the decision to merge and the decision to invest have strong strategic
components that depend on rivals’ actions.
To clarify intuition, consider the wireless telecommunications industry.
This is an industry characterized by high expenditures on investment, rapid in-
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novation, and is dominated by a few large firms whose market share is volatile
in response to these innovations. Another notable aspect is that smaller firms
and new entrants are commonly bought out by the industry’s larger incumbent
firms. Consolidation through merger has been the dominant mode of industry
evolution over the past decade and a half. A prime concern of antitrust au-
thorities when reviewing these mergers has been the effects of the merger on
firm incentives to invest in improving their network or expanding coverage of
the latest technology.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of mergers on
investment by studying mergers in an Ericson-Pakes style dynamic oligopoly
model. I choose this approach for two reasons. As Gowrisankaran (1999)
argues at length, studying the implications of exogenous mergers or those in
a static model suffers from a number of flaws. Dating back many decades, a
number of authors have shown that adding a dynamic component can overturn
standard results on mergers.1 More importantly, however, the issue that this
paper is concerned with is inherently dynamic. Future investment, exit, and
entry, along with the potential for other future mergers, can have a dramatic
effect on the welfare implications and profitability of today’s potential merger,
and without a dynamic model these aspects are unaccounted for.
Despite this, little work has been done on models of dynamic merg-
ers. Cheong and Judd (1997) study mergers in a dynamic model where firms
1
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set price and quantity and adjust using inventories. They present numerical
results showing that short-run increases in profits can make otherwise unprof-
itable mergers worthwhile. Chen (2009) studies a market of capacity con-
strained, homogenous product Bertrand competition with investment. This
model is hand-calibrated and results in mergers that are typically profitable
and welfare reducing. Both of these consider only exogenous mergers.
Only a few studies have been done of endogenous mergers in a dynamic
context. Pesendorfer (2005) derives theoretical predictions from a Cournot
model with entry, exit and mergers. He finds that the standard Cournot
result is overturned if firms expect the possibility of mergers in the future,
demonstrating the importance of both dynamics and endogeneity. [37] study
optimal merger policy in a 2 firm model of dynamic, endogenous mergers
and find that antitrust policy can have a significant beneficial impact on firm
investment policy. Gowrisankaran (1999, 2004) studies the issue in a standard
dynamic oligopoly model and in a dominant firm model. This paper will in
some respects follow Gowrisanakaran (1999) and so I will describe it in detail.
Gowrisankaran (1999) considers an Ericson Pakes style model of dy-
namic oligopoly with capacity-constrained, constant marginal cost, homoge-
nous goods producers. Firms enter, invest, merge, and/or exit in each period.
The merger stage consists of a sequential bid model where, in each period the
largest firm may buy out any smaller firm. If it does so, the process begins
anew. If it does not, the second largest firm may buy out any smaller firm, and
so on. The model is parameterized and solved and a range of numerical results
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and comparative statics are presented. Because firms only merge to increase
market share, and no countervailing effect such as cost reduction is present,
consumer welfare is always worsened by mergers. Similarly, investment always
declines as firms internalize the investment externality. The impacts on total
welfare are ambiguous. Gowrisankaran (1999) is impressive for overcoming
the many technical challenges of solving a large dynamic oligopoly model with
endogenous mergers and we hope to build on this.
The question of how a merger impacts incentives to innovate is closely
related to the larger question of what is the relationship between the level
of competition in an industry and the amount of investment or innovation
in that industry? This is one of the most important questions in economics,
as long run welfare is determined by the rate of technological growth and
antitrust policymakers have a direct impact on the level of competition in many
industries. A horizontal merger represents a direct decrease in competition and
by studying pre and post-merger investment I hope to shed light on this larger
question.
I proceed by embedding an endogenous merger stage game into an
Ericson-Pakes style dynamic oligopoly model where firms produce differenti-
ated goods and compete in prices. They engage in entry, exit, and invest in
future product quality. In each period firms may enter merger negotiations
with one another. At this time they draw a random “synergy” value, reflect-
ing the complementarities between their products. If the firms merge, in the
following period they will produce a new, higher-quality product reflecting
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the previous qualities and level of synergy. This model is solved using the
stochastic algorithm method of Pakes-McGuire (2001).
This paper provides contributions in two ways. By extending and en-
riching the literature on dynamic, endogenous mergers it furthers our under-
standing on the causes and consequences of horizontal mergers. By testing the
impact of horizontal mergers on investment, entry and exit it contributes to
our understanding of the relationship between competition and innovation.
The model is solved numerically and shown to fit broad facts from
aggregate mergers data quite well in many respects. Several types of counter-
factuals are considered. Preliminary results confirm our intuition on the main
forces at play. We observe that firms primarily use mergers as a substitute
for innovation, buying out smaller firms and consequently reducing their in-
vestment. Yet despite this, total entry and investment are significantly higher
when mergers are allowed. The potential of receiving a windfall profit by being
bought out by a larger firm provides a powerful incentive to enter the market
and to invest so as to make one’s firm an attractive merger partner.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows, section 2 describes
the model, section 3 describes the nature of equilibrium and method of com-
putation, and section 4 presents preliminary results.
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3.2 Model
Industry dynamics are based on the standard Ericson-Pakes framework,
which features an infinite horizon, discrete time set of firms who invest, enter,
and exit endogenously. This model and its properties and many applications
are reviewed at length in Doraszelski and Pakes (2006), and will be given a
shorter treatment here with more emphasis on the model’s novel elements,
specifically the merger stage. In the model, a set of constant marginal cost
firms produce heterogenous goods and compete in prices. The goods differ
with respect to their qualities and firms can invest in future product quality
using a stochastic R&D technology. Each period, firms are allowed to enter
merger negotiations with any other firm following a random sequence. Firms
will attempt to merge if the net gain to the acquiring firm is greater than the
reservation value of the acquired firm. The merger is quality-increasing, in
that the products may be combined into a new product. Here, for each rival
firm, the offerer will draw some “synergy” value reflecting the degree to which
their products can be integrated.
3.2.1 Incumbent Firms
At any given time there are n ≤ n firms active in the market, each pro-
ducing a good of quality ωi. This quality can be thought of as a function over
a bundle of characteristics. For instance, the quality of a wireless company’s
product is a function of its coverage network, the quality of the network, the
quality and variety of handsets, etc. The set of firms’ qualities will be referred
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to as Ω = {ω1, ..., ωn}. This is public information and represents the state of
the industry. This closely follows the quality ladder model of Pakes-McGuire
(1994). Consumers preferences form a discrete choice model, with consumer
k’s utility from good i given by uk,i = g(ωi)−pi+ k,i, where g(·) is an increas-
ing and bounded function and i,k represents consumers’ differing tastes. Each
consumer purchases one unit of the product which gives them the highest util-
ity. They may also purchase an “outside option” whose utility is normalized
to 0.
Following the work of McFadden (1974), if  is drawn from an extreme
value distribution, this results in the logit demand system:
qi(p1, ...pn; Ω) = M
exp(g(ωi)− pi)
1 +
∑
j exp(g(ωj − pj))
(3.1)
where qi(·) is firm i’s demand and M is the size of the market, or the measure of
consumers. Firms choose prices conditional on the set of goods in the market
to maximize profits, computed as:
pi(ωi, ω−i) = qi(p1, ..., pn; Ω)(pi − c) (3.2)
Firms invest in their future quality with a stochastic R&D type tech-
nology. Quality evolves according to:
ωi,t+1 = ωi,t − νi,t + ηt (3.3)
The first component of this evolution is the outcome of the firms investment
activity, where a firm chooses investment intensity xi,t, and
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Pr(ν|xi) =
{
αxi
1+αxi
if ν = 1
1
1+αxi
if ν = 0
(3.4)
where α parameterizes the efficiency of the investment technology. The re-
maining component of quality evolution is an industry wide shock η that takes
the value 0 with probability δ and is 1 otherwise. This represents industry
wide decline in product quality or improvement in the attractiveness of the
outside option.
Firms also face a flat, fixed operating cost FC which must be paid each
period. At the end of each period, firms choose whether to remain in business
and pay FC or exit. The incumbent firm’s end of period problem is thus:
V I(ωi, ω−i) = max{0,max
xi
−xi + βEV (ω′i, ω′−i|xi)} (3.5)
3.2.2 Merger Stage
The bulk of previous research studying the implications of horizontal
mergers has examined the behavior of exogenously merged firms. This is due
to the fact that, although clearly superior in many ways, modeling endogenous
mergers poses a challenge. In many industries there may exist a set of prof-
itable but mutually exclusive merger arrangements. The mergers in this set
represent multiple equilibria and there is no clear equilibrium selection mecha-
nism. The simplest solution is to model non-cooperative mergers, where firms
propose buyout offers according to some defined sequence which provides a
unique equilibrium in each stage.
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Gowrisankaran (1999) follows this approach, embedding in an Ericson-
Pakes model a stage game wherein the largest firm acts first. It has the ability
to propose a merger to any other firm. If it chooses not to the second largest
firm may propose, and so on. The stage game employed here is similar although
the sequence by which firms may propose mergers is the result of a random
draw. While this adds to the difficulty of solving the model, it should result
in a richer pattern of mergers.
At the beginning of each period, a firm will be randomly chosen and
allowed to enter merger negotiations with any other firm. Two merger tech-
nologies will be considered. The first is quality improving. Before choosing
its partner, the offering firm receives a random “synergy” value for each rival
firm σj ∈ [0, 1]∀j. This represents the degree to which their products can be
integrated into a new future product. The period following the merger, the
new, combined firm will produce a product of quality ωi + σjωj. For this, its
helpful to think of a product more broadly than a single physical good, but
rather as a bundle of characteristics or services. In wireless mergers, the net-
work is expanded and the set of available handsets increases.2 The degree of
2For instance, in attempting to purchase T-Mobile USA, in March 2011 AT&T claimed
the following: “AT&T and T-Mobile USA customers will see service improvements - in-
cluding improved voice quality - as a result of additional spectrum, increased cell tower
density and broader network infrastructure. At closing, AT&T will immediately gain cell
sites equivalent to what would have taken on average five years to build without the trans-
action, and double that in some markets. The combination will increase AT&Ts network
density by approximately 30 percent in some of its most populated areas, while avoiding
the need to construct additional cell towers.”
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synergy might reflect the amount of overlap between the two firms’ networks
pre-merger, for instance.
Under an alternative technology, the two firms’ products will continue
to be produced by the new combined firm. The combined firm will face differ-
ent pricing incentives when competing in the product market. The firm will
set prices to maximize the joint profit over all its products.
Conditional on the set of synergy draws (or lack thereof), the proposing
firm will either propose a merger with the firm offering the highest return in
the merger stage or pass on the option. If the firm passes, a new firm is
chosen at random and given the opportunity to offer a merger. The process
continues until all firms have had an opportunity or a merger occurs. The
only restriction on mergers is a simple antitrust rule preventing merger to
monopoly. Because firms know that if they refuse a buyout offer they may be
the next firm with the power to propose a merger, they may have the incentive
to turn down a profitable merger foreseeing another, more profitable merger
with some other firm. Similarly, they may accept or propose a less valuable
merger to prevent two other firms in the market from merging and becoming
too powerful. Because synergy draws are random and private information,
this merger stage game can be quite complex but results in a rich and fully
endogenous pattern of mergers.
Once negotiations begin, the higher valued firm will always take the
role of acquirer. The merger’s surplus is the difference between the combined
firm’s value and the sum of the separate firms’ values. If there is a positive
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surplus from the firms’ merger, it will be split between the two parties. This
split will be according to each firms bargaining power, which will be equal.
The empirical finance literature has mixed results on the shares of a merger’s
surplus going to either party, but most work finds the shares roughly equal.3
Endogenizing the bargaining powers is one aspect of ongoing work. The reser-
vation price of the firm being acquired is its value if the negotiation fails and
they move to the investment stage unmerged. The value to the acquiring firm
is the difference in values between the combined firm and its value if nego-
tiations fail. Let V B(·) and V S(·) be the values of the buyer and the seller,
denote the purchase price of the acquired firm as
τij = V
S(Ω′|mij = 0)+1
2
[V B(Ω′|mij = 1, σj)−V B(Ω′|mij = 0)−V S(Ω′|mij = 0)]
(3.6)
where mij indicates whether or not a merger was agreed to by both parties,
with 1 meaning it was. The first term is the reservation value of the acquired
firm and the second term is the share of the surplus from the acquiring firm
that is paid out.
The value of a firm at the beginning of a period is thus:
V (ωi, ω−i) = pi(ωi, ω−i)− FC +
∑
i
∑
j
ˆ
[0,1]
Pr(mij)V
I(ω′i, ω
′
−i|mij, σj)dσ
(3.7)
3See, for instance, Ahern (2012).
36
where Pr(mij) is the probability of a merger between firms i and j, and includes
the distribution over which firm is chosen to begin the merger stage and the
likelihood of each pairing based on the synergy draws.
3.2.3 Potential Entrants
In each period, a single firm may enter the market. The potential
entrant lives for a single period and must pay an entry cost to join the industry,
becoming an incumbent and competing in the product market in the following
period. Potential entrants draw a random setup cost from some distribution
F e(·) and compare this cost to the expected net present value of entering.
The timing of the model is such that potential entrants make their entry and
investment decision at the end of the period, simultaneous with existing firms
making their exit and investment decisions. Thus entrants have the ability to
observe any merger activity in the past period before entering. The entrant’s
potential value is given by:
V E(Ω, cei) = max{0,max
xei
−cei − xei + βEV (ω′i, ω′−i|xei)} (3.8)
3.3 Equilibrium and Computation
I will consider Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) for this model. If s ∈ S
represents some element of the state space, a MPE consists of:
 A subset R ⊂ S;
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 Strategies χ∗ for every s ∈ R, where χ∗ = (χE, χEX ,mij, τij, xi, xei) re-
spectively governing entry, exit, mergers, buyout offers, and investment.
 Expected discounted values conditional on these strategies, V E(Ω, cei), V (ωi, ω−i),
V M(Ω, i, j, σj)∀j, and V I(ωi, ω−i).
Such that:
1. The Markov process defined by any initial condition s0 and the strategies
χ∗ has R as a recurrent class.
2. For every s ∈ R, strategies are optimal given V E(·), V (·), V M(·), and
V I(·). That is, χ∗(Ω) solves:
max
χE
V E(Ω, cei), max
χEX ,xi
V I(ωi, ω−i), max
χM ,mij ,τij
V M(Ω, i, j, σj)
3. Values are consistent on R. For every Ω and Ω′ which are components
of s ∈ R:
V (ωi, ω−i) = pi(ωi, ω−i)−FC+
∑
i
∑
j
ˆ
[0,1]
Pr(mij)V
I(ω′i, ω
′
−i|mij, σj)dσ
V I(ωi, ω−i) = max{0,max
xi
−xi + βEV (ω′i, ω′−i|xi)}
V E(χE∗, xei|Ω, cei) = max{0,maxxei − cei − xei + βEV (ω′i, ω′−i|xei)}
An MPE for this model can be shown to exist following Doraszelski and
Satterthwaite (2010). There is no way to rule out the possibility of multiple
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equilibria. The multiplicity problem poses a challenge for counterfactual policy
analysis and so will be discussed at greater length below. For a fuller discussion
of potential multiplicity, see Doraszelski and Pakes (2006). The model is too
complex to allow an analytic solution, instead, it is solved computationally
using the stochastic algorithm of Pakes-McGuire (2001). The computational
burden of the model described is enormous. The size of the state space grows
exponentially in the number of firms and potential good qualities, and for
each state, the integral over potential future states required to calculate the
expected discounted value of different actions involves probability distributions
over the random sequence of merger proposers, synergy draws, exit and entry
behavior, and the outcomes of investment. The computational burden of this
high-dimensional integral and state space is the reason there has been little
work done on this type of analysis to date.
The measure of product quality ω is mapped onto the integers {0, ..., 10},
and the profit function is bounded above such that the upper bound on qual-
ity, ω = 10 does not bind in equilibrium. The number of firms or products
allowed in the market is limited by n = 4 which does bind in equilibrium in
some periods. The next version of this paper solves the model for n = 6 and
this should no longer be the case.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Model Performance
The model is solved numerically with initial parameter values taken
primarily from Pakes-McGuire (1994) with merger fixed costs set low at .1.
The full set of parameters can be seen in Table 3.1. The model produces re-
sults that fit the data quite well in several respects. Firm acquisitions occur
in 4.3% of periods, compared to 3.89% in the Longitudinal Research Database
over the period 1974-1992, as documented by David (2013). David (2013) also
documents the pattern of firms acting as acquirers and targets in the Thom-
son Reuters SDC Platinum database. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, the share of
acquirers is steadily increasing in firm size, whereas the distribution of tar-
gets over firm size is hump shaped and symmetric. The same pattern emerges
endogenously in our results, as shown in Figure 3.2.
Table 3.1: Base Parameterization
α 3
β .925
n 4
ω 10
ωe 1
FC .1
cM 1
δ .6
ce ∼ Unif [0, 10]
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Figure 3.1: Marginal Distribution of Merging Firms in Data
Note: This figure is taken from David (2013), it shows results from data taken from
Reuters SDC Platinum database of transactions.
3.4.2 Mergers and Innovation Incentives
In this section I turn to the question of how horizontal mergers affect
firm innovation. The general pattern in the model is of high investment by
low and medium size firms trying to become the market leader, as very high
profits are associated with having the highest quality good in the industry.
Firms also invest significantly more in the presence of a “rival” firm, where
rivals are defined as firms with quality states within 1 of one another. In a
rivalry situation both firms invest significantly more in an attempt to escape
it and become market leader. See Figure 3.3.
In addition to this, I consider the general relationship between invest-
ment and the level of competition in the market. Aghion et. al. (2005) identify
an inverted-U relationship in this relationship, where market with low levels
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Distribution of Merging Firms in Model
of product market competition as well as high levels experience lower levels of
innovation. I plot investment levels in my model against market HHI and find
the same result, see Figure 3.4.
To test the question of how horizontal mergers affect incentives to in-
novate, I first perform the simple comparison of the model with mergers to
that without mergers. A brief note of caution is warranted at this point, as
mentioned above the possibility of multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out for
this type of model. I simply offer the standard disclaimer that as I worked to
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Figure 3.3: Firm Investment Patterns
Figure 3.4: Inverse-U Relationship in Model
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optimize the model’s computation I experimented with a very large number
of different initializations and updating procedures, no other equilibrium was
reached than that presented here. Nevertheless, comparing two different so-
lutions of the model may be invalid as some part of the difference in results
could represent different equilibrium behaviors and not just the difference in
policy or technology.
Table 3.2 shows results from this simple comparison. I show that when
mergers are allowed the total amount of investment is significantly higher. This
is true both of total investment and average firm investment. When mergers
are allowed there is much more entry into the industry, resulting in more firms
that are smaller on average and invest more. Entry increases from .1% of
periods to 8.1% of periods. This follows our intuition that the prospect of
being bought out and receiving a large windfall gain from the merger surplus
increases the attractiveness of entry and spurs greater competition in that
way. Because the smallest firms are rarely bought out, new entrants also
have a high incentive to invest and improve their products until they are an
attractive merger partner.
Table 3.2: Comparison of equilibrium with and without mergers
Mergers No mergers
Mean Investment 5.59 4.77
Mean Firm Size 6.57 7.66
Mean Number of Firms 3.45 2.99
Share of periods with entry .081 .001
Share of periods with exit .0029 .001
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I now perform a more subtle counterfactual and one with no multiplicity
concerns. I look at the results of the model with mergers and examine firm
policy functions at states where mergers occur. At these states, a merger may
or may not occur depending on random shocks over synergy and the sequence
of offerers. For each I can examine firm policy functions post-merger and in a
counterfactual where the merger does not occur and thus see the distribution
of outcomes resulting from the mergers.
As table 3.3 shows, firms that merge invest significantly less than they
would have in the absence of the merger. Large firms are using mergers as
a substitute for investment. I also note that the other firms in the industry
invest less post-merger than they otherwise would. This results from the fact
that a majority of firms engaging in horizontal mergers do so to escape a
“rivalry” situation, which results in less investment by the non-merging rival.
When comparing the policy functions of potential entrants in the post-merger
states to entry policies if no merger were to occur, we see a dramatically higher
likelihood of entry post-merger. If no merger occurs the potential entrant will
join the industry 39% of periods on average, but if there is a merger they will
enter in 97% of periods.
I can also compare consumer surplus in the post-merger markets to
those if the merger did not occur. Post-merger markets result in lower con-
sumer surplus 58% of the time, as well as lower investment in 78% of periods,
suggesting a role for active antitrust policy. One future goal of this paper is to
more concretely identify which mergers result in lower consumer surplus and
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Table 3.3: Comparison of policies at merger states
Merger No merger
Mean Investment 7.90 10.22
Mean Investment - Merging firms 5.80 10.40
Mean Investment - Non-merging firms 9.28 10.07
Likelihood of entry .97 .39
Consumer Surplus 5.99 6.18
less investment in a way that can inform policymakers.
By comparing outcomes only at states where mergers occur, we do miss
part of the full picture, specifically the behavior of firms that may be investing
highly to position themselves as an attractive merger partner. The results
of the two counterfactual exercises presented here complement one another
in that respect, especially as they generally tell the same basic story. Firms
buyout smaller firms as a substitute for investment but this process creates
the incentives for higher total investment and greater entry.
3.5 Future Work
3.5.1 Multiproduct Firms
I also consider an alternative merger technology, where instead of com-
bining products the newly merged firm continues to produce both products.
Solving for equilibrium in an Ericson-Pakes model with multiproduct firms
is computationally challenging and there is no previous literature considering
this setting. Preliminary results for mergers in an industry with multiproduct
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firms are forthcoming, but suggest that the positive assortative matching ob-
served in the data replicates in the model. That is, firms merge with similarly
sized firms, as these mergers allow the largest reduction in the negative pricing
externality that takes place in Bertrand competition.
3.5.2 Optimal Antitrust Policy
To this point the paper has only considered a trivial antitrust policy of
not allowing mergers to monopoly, but it is possible optimal antitrust policy
along two interesting dimensions. This requires inserting the antitrust author-
ity into the game, specifying its objective function and information set, and
solving for the optimal policy simultaneously with firm policy functions. This
can take a number of forms and can answer a range of interesting questions
concerning optimal policy under uncertainty. Several recent papers also look
at the question of optimal antitrust policy in a dynamic setting. [37] stud-
ies the issue of optimal policy in a 2 firm homogenous goods market. They
find that a policy of preventing most or even all mergers is welfare enhancing
by preventing inefficient entry for buyout. [40] consider how antitrust pol-
icy might differ from a static policy if the setting is dynamic and rejecting a
merger today influences the set of potential mergers in the future. They find
that, when this effect is accounted for, it is optimal to reject some mergers
which increase consumer surplus in order to induce more beneficial mergers in
the future.
Here the antitrust authority’s problem is defined by some information
47
set s and some objective function r(s). Each period a merger is proposed, the
antitrust authority (AA) evaluates it against the discounted present value of
this objective function by solving the problem
χ∗(s,m) = argmax q(s) + βEV (s′). (3.9)
Here, m is a vector describing the relevant factors of the merger
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Chapter 4
The Spread of Horizontal Chains: Efficiency
or Market Power?
4.1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, the chain business model has come to
dominate most retail and service industries. [23] document a striking growth
in shares of sales, employment and number of establishments affiliated with
chains.1 This trend has attracted interest from policymakers and economists
concerned with issues ranging from employment and wages, to competition, to
aggregate productivity.2. This broad scope reflects the fact that organizational
form matters for a variety of economic outcomes. The success of the horizontal
chain business model has been striking, but what explains this success? Why
do firms organize into chains? The conventional explanation is that firms form
chains to take advantage of economies of scale and operate more efficiently. An
alternative, demand-side explanation is that consumers value chains’ ability
1See Figure 4.1, taken from [23].
2Examples of work on wages and employment include [6] and [30] For work on com-
petition, see [7], [9], and [31], among others. Research on aggregate productivity includes
[23] and [12]. This is just a sample of the available literature, for a more comprehensive
overview, see [32].
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to credibly signal their quality in low information settings. These theories
have different implications for welfare and for the future of competition in
these industries. This paper seeks to examine these different explanations
empirically and quantify the importance of them by studying the hotel industry
in Texas.
Dating back to Adam Smith, economists have understood the role of
scale economies in influencing the structure of industries. A natural explana-
tion, then, for why independent businesses would join together into a chain
network is that this allows them to exploit economies of scale to lower costs
and enhance efficiency. The costs of advertising can be spread over more firms,
inputs can be purchased with greater bargaining power and distributed using
a network that spreads fixed costs. Firms may have greater access to capi-
tal when affiliated with a known and successful chain. Similarly, managerial
expertise and other productivity and efficiency enhancing knowledge can be
quickly disseminated.
A second major explanation arises from the pioneering work on the
economics of information begun by Stigler, Akerlof, and Stiglitz, among oth-
ers. In many industries, particularly industries with little repeat business or
which sell experience goods, consumers have very prior little information on
the quality of the product or service that firms offer. If consumers are risk
averse, they favor firms whose reputation they know and may find search and
experimentation costly.3 Firms in settings where little information is available
3In a seminal article, [33] discusses the importance of firm reputation, [28] further exam-
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Figure 4.1: The Spread of Chain Firms
Note: This figure is taken from Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006). Data comes from
the Longitudinal Business Database. Here SU stands for single-unit and MU stands for
multi-unit (chain).
may affiliate with one another and operate under one banner to take advan-
tage of its reputation for consistent quality standards to attract risk averse
consumers. Firms affiliated with a well-known chain can thus charge a sub-
stantial premium over independent firms offering uncertain quality even if the
underlying product is identical. In essence, chains may be offering a solution
to a lemons problem by facilitating repeat interactions that could not other-
wise occur by providing uniform services in many settings. This is, in a way,
economies of scale on the demand side, as the larger the chain is the more
consumers have the opportunity to interact with it, increasing its value.
Which of these explanations is primarily responsible for the rise of the
ines the role of firm reputation in competition, and [13] explicitly model reputation building
in low information environments as an incentive for horizontal expansion. Other examples of
recent work on competition when consumers have low information and form brand loyalties
include [10], [11] and [48].
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chain model, lower costs or low information? The answer is of interest for
several reasons. First, the implications for consumers may differ. Success due
to greater efficiency or lower costs are unambiguously positive for consumers,
improving competition and lowering prices. If the chain model is successful
mainly due to low information, however, the effects are more ambiguous. Con-
sumers may find themselves paying higher prices for the same quality good due
to market power, but they may also find more high quality goods available.
Second, the answer has implications for competition in the future. Over
the past decade online review and rating websites have allowed consumers to
document and share their experiences with almost every conceivable type of
firm.4 Many industries are in the middle of a transition from a very low
to relatively high information environment, and the path this transition will
take depends on what has driven the chain model’s success to this point.
Finally, there are potentially antitrust implications. The extent of possible
cost efficiencies is a key question when evaluating a merger. In addition,
if chains can charge a premium because of their ability to facilitate repeat
interactions, a merger of chains could increase this premium and thus increase
prices. Theory alone cannot tell us which of these forces, efficiency or low
information, is driving the success of chains. This paper instead will use a
unique firm level dataset on the hotel industry to examine empirically the
nature of chain affiliation and the relative contribution of each factor to firm
4According to the Local Consumer Review Survey 2012, 85% of consumers checked online
reviews before making purchasing decisions in 2012.
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profits.
I use data on quarterly revenue for every hotel in Texas from 2000-2012.
Two features of this data are particularly useful. I observe the full population
of firms, allowing a direct comparison between chain affiliated and indepen-
dent firms. In addition, observing firm revenue makes it possible to separate
demand side factors from cost side factors. This data is supplemented with
information from AAA and TripAdvisor.com, as well as information about the
markets in which they operate. While the data is limited to one state, Texas
is helpfully a very large and heterogenous state with interesting local demand
shifters for hotel services. We observe data on 1,465 unique hotels competing
in hundreds of distinct markets since 2000, with a close to even split between
independent firms and chains.
The lodging industry is an ideal setting to examine the questions pre-
sented above for several reasons. First, hotels compete in a large number of ge-
ographically distinct markets. Second, unlike retailers or firms in other service
industries, they offer close to a single product, a night’s stay in a room. This
product is differentiated between firms almost entirely on universally agreed
on quality and not other factors. These result in a relatively straightforward
problem with few confounding factors. Third, the trend towards chain firms in
this industry closely matches the aggregate trend.5 Finally, franchising and the
hotel industry are significant sectors of the economy in their own right, with
5This can be seen by comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.7.
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hotels generating $177 billion in sales in 2007 and employing 2 million individ-
uals according to the 2007 Economic Census, and franchises were responsible
for $1.3 trillion sales (9.2% of GDP) and 7.9 million employed ([32]).
The empirical strategy I pursue takes two parts. The first is a reduced
form examination of hotel revenue and the value of chain affiliation. This in-
cludes examining the impact on revenues of hotels that add or drop affiliation
during the sample period. I find that conditional on firm and market char-
acteristics, chains earn over 20% higher revenue per room than independent
firms. I then examine the nature of this advantage and find it to be consistent
with a variety of predictions of a model of low consumer information as op-
posed to other potential explanations. The chain premium declines over the
past decade as online reputation mechanisms become more widely used. The
chain premium appears immediately when a firm joins a chain, as opposed to
slowly phasing in, and it is positively correlated with chain size, as a model
of repeat interactions would predict. Finally, online reviews data show strong
correlations between customer information and independent firm success and
for firms with large numbers of online reviews the chain premium disappears
completely.
I next examine the conventional explanation that chain firms are more
efficient than independent firms by examining their operating costs. These
costs are unobserved, instead I estimate a dynamic model in the style of [3]
to recover the cost structure of the different firm types to examine what cost
or efficiency advantage is associated with chain affiliation. The identification
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strategy is to take observed revenues and observed entry and exit decisions
and find the set of costs that best rationalize them. The dynamic model
produces realistic estimates of firm operating costs. They suggest, however,
that chain firms gain no cost advantage from their affiliation, and in fact may
have slightly higher entry and operating costs than independent firms after
controlling for quality and unobserved market level heterogeneity. This model
can then be used to test the dynamic effects of policies limiting chain firms
of the sort proposed in various jurisdictions.6 I solve the model using the
estimated parameters and run counterfactual simulations under a range of
policies restricting chain entry. These suggest that limitations on chain firms
result in fewer total firms in equilibrium and lower quality firms on average.
A growing literature addresses the spread of chains. In part this reflects
the success of large retailers such as Wal-Mart ([6], [9], [23], [27] and [31]).
This literature also takes advantage of newly developed methods to estimate
structural models of competition from entry and location decisions, including
[46], [47], and [1] on fast-food; [17] on movie theatres; [43] and [39] on video
rental stores; and [38] and Villa-Boas (2007) on supermarkets; and [45] and
[35] on hotels. These papers consider entry and location decisions, sometimes
combined with structural demand models, and study their implications on
firms’ underlying cost structures and the nature of competition. [45] uses the
same data source as this paper and similar methods in a study of land-use
6For instance, San Francisco bans firms with more than 11 outlets from operating in
many areas. Other examples are discussed in section 4.
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regulations.7
While these papers study various aspects of the economics of chain
organization, none consider the broader question of why firms organize in this
way. In addition, no previous work considers the demand side explanation for
chain affiliation and how asymmetric information may be driving organization
form patterns. My data allow this question to be addressed by including
two features: data are not limited to location and entry decisions, but also
include market outcome data in the form of firm level revenue, and the data
also include the full population of firms in the market, and are not limited to
specific chains like Wal-Mart.
[36] is one of the few studies that considers the same margin as this
paper, the firm’s decision of whether or not to join a chain. That paper also
considers the hotel industry. Using a different dataset he examines how the
decision to join a chain or not varies over different market types. He finds
that firms are more likely to be chain affiliated on highly trafficked roads
and less likely off major highways. He attributes this to potentially different
shares of repeat business customers, where fewer repeat customers increase the
importance of chain affiliation as a signal of quality. I find many of the same
results in my data but am able to extend the analysis using a panel of firm
revenue in addition to location decisions.
7[45] also estimates a dynamic model using Texas hotels data to test if land-use regula-
tions raise firm costs. The key differences between [45] and this paper are that his focus is
on total entry costs, which I do not estimate, and he restricts attention to the firms in the
6 largest chains.
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Another literature in economics considers the firm’s decision with re-
spect to organizational form from a somewhat different perspective. In the
vertical integration and franchising literature, these primarily take the form
of cross-industry or cross-firm studies examining the correlation between orga-
nization form choice and potential explanations, including transaction costs,
monitoring difficulty, property rights, and risk sharing. [32] or [34] and the pa-
pers described therein provide results on firm strategies with respect to what
share of outlets to franchise, in what markets to franchise outlets, and on the
relative performance of outlet type.
The rest of this paper will contain as follows: section 2 will describe the
data and examine the revenue effects of chain affiliation, section 3 will develop
a dynamic model and empirical strategy, and section 4 presents results from
this model.
4.2 Revenue Analysis
In this section I will document a revenue premium associated with chain
affiliation and argue that this premium is sufficient evidence of market power.8
Ideally, we would observe prices and quantities directly, but unfortunately only
overall revenue is observed and thus demand cannot be estimated, and in any
event there is generally no single price for a hotel room. Prices vary over
the time of year, day of week, and even method of purchase. I instead focus
8I use market power to mean the ability to raise prices above marginal cost, not in the
stronger sense in which the term “market power” is used in antitrust settings.
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on a firm revenue as a measure of performance,which is the measure most
widely used in the industry. In a review of similarly rated hotels located in
the same market, I observe that unaffiliated hotels almost never charge higher
prices than comparable chain hotels. If chain prices are weakly higher than
unaffiliated prices, higher revenue implies either prices are higher or greater
capacity is filled despite similar prices. Both imply greater market power.
4.2.1 Data
The state of Texas collects a special hotel occupancy tax. Consequently,
the full quarterly revenues of all Texas lodging establishments is available from
the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. Tax revenue data is particularly
trustworthy because incorrectly reporting it is considered unlawful tax evasion.
For each hotel I also collect location, capacity and a measure of age. This
information, along with chain affiliation, was cross checked with a number
of sources including the AAA Tourbook and various hotels booking websites.
The AAA Tourbook also provides us with a standardized measure of quality,
giving a rating of 1 through 4 stars for each hotel listed. Of the hotels in our
sample, 57% of affiliated firms have been rated. As AAA does not rate firms
below a minimum quality standard, unrated firms are assigned a score of 1
star. My analysis focuses on rural markets, in which the bulk of hotels are
one or two stars. The full distribution of star ratings breaks down as follows:
52.9% one star or unrated, 28.9% two stars, 17.9% three stars, and 0.2% four
stars.
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I also collect data from TripAdvisor.com, the world’s largest travel re-
view website. TripAdvisor.com was until recently a subsidiary of Expedia.com,
along with Hotels.com and Hotwire.com. Users rate firms on a 5 star scale and
leave detailed reviews. The data is a December 2012 cross-section containing
average user rating, the number and distribution of reviews, each firm’s rank-
ing within their market, and the number of reviews by reviewer type (business,
family, etc.) I also calculate the standard deviation of user ratings from the
ratings distribution.
The analysis here is largely restricted to rural markets, where a market
is defined as rural if there is no other market within 20 miles of it.910 This is
for three reasons. Large cities and their suburbs contain a very large number
of hotels. These hotels are more horizontally differentiated in a number of
unobservable ways, some cater to business travelers, others to recreational,
and within a large, sprawling city such as Houston, location is a key concern.
It is not necessarily clear, therefore, which firms are competing with whom, and
thus how to define a market, and there is probably a large degree of unobserved
heterogeneity. Second, hotel chains often own and operate a small number of
their properties themselves. These are concentrated in large markets, whereas
in rural markets nearly 100% of chain hotels are franchised out. This matters
9For all results that follow, I define market as nearest city but also include firms in
the same county among potential competitors. In addition, because hotel customers are
frequently highway travellers, there is still potential substitution across markets. As a
result, for markets on major highways I test inclusion of the firms in adjacent counties as
potential competitors. I find that including them has no significant effect on results.
10Excluded markets are shown in Figure 4.8
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because chain affiliation will be assumed to be endogenous at the level of the
hotel for some of what follows. Fortunately, Texas contains a great many rural
and isolated markets. After restricting attention to these markets, our sample
contains 353 markets with 1465 hotels. The mean market had 2 chain and
2.77 independent hotels active in 2012. As seen in Figure 4.7, the Texas rural
hotel industry displays the same dynamics seen nationally, very strong recent
growth by chain firms.
The measure of performance I will focus on is daily revenue per available
room, or “RevPar”. This is computed simply as revenue divided by capacity
and the number of days in the reporting period. For much of what follows
I use annual means, aggregating up from quarterly, because of large seasonal
fluctuations in demand and because most market data are annual. For the full
sample, mean chain RevPar is $32.07 and mean independent RevPar is $19.07.
Summary statistics can be seen in Table 4.2. The physical distribution of chain
and independent firms is mapped in Figure 4.2, with excluded counties in red.
Data show that along with being more likely to have a high quality
rating, chain affiliated hotels are more likely to be active in larger and more
attractive markets. To account for demand side factors that influence firm rev-
enue and market structure, I collect a variety of data on each market. From the
Census Bureau I collect data on county unemployment rate and population,
and total county retail sales as measures of market size or business activity.
From the Texas Railroad Commission I add data on the number of currently
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Figure 4.2: Independent and Chain Firms
producing wells for both oil and natural gas in each county. I also gather Texas
Department of Transportation data on average daily traffic passing through
each market. This measure is a key determinant of demand in the rural road-
side hotel industry. Summary statistics on these data can be seen in Table
4.1. Together, variation across time and markets in these factors should help
capture exogenous shifts in demand. In particular, the growth of the natural
gas industry in Texas over the past decade has had a significant impact on
hotel demand and is clear exogenous to hotel performance. Examples of this
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Table 4.1: Market Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max
County Firms
Chains 4.24 3.76 0 19
Independents 4.15 3.41 0 17
Demand Shifters
Daily Traffic 14,289 13,756 0 100,000
Population 20,130 279,734 880 423,970
Total Sales ($billion) 3.41 20.6 0.03 438
Gas Wells 326.6 737.3 0 6155
Oil Wells 461.9 843,5 0 8261
Unemployment 5.72 2.27 1.9 17.8
Note: This table presents summary statistics on market
characteristics, where market refers to county. For visual
representation, see Figure 4.9.
impact on revenue and entry patterns will be described below.
4.2.2 Revenue Estimates
In this section, I show that chain firms earn a substantial revenue pre-
mium over otherwise identical independent firms. Table 4.2 shows that, on
average, chain firms earn higher revenues, but this could reflect a number of
factors. To test if chain affiliated firms earn a revenue premium after con-
trolling for a large set of firm and market characteristics, I regress RevPar on
these market specific factors as well as the number of chain and independent
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competitors in the market. Specifically, I consider the model
RevParimt = ximtβ1 + firmitβ2 + citδ
c +marketm + timet + imt, (4.1)
where ximt are data on market characteristics such as population, as well as
the number and type of competitors in each market, firmit are other firm
characteristics such as AAA rating and TripAdvisor.com rating, cit indicates
whether a firm is a member of a chain in period t, and market and time are
year and market dummies. The ultimate object of interest is δc, which is the
remaining effect on revenue of chain affiliation after controlling for firm and
market characteristics.
While market structure variables are endogenous with respect to the
same demand conditions that partially determine revenue, I am not concerned
with this causing bias in estimation. Opening or closing a firm is a long
term decision with new firms having a time to build of over a year. As a
result, short term fluctuations in demand conditions should have little effect
on market structure. I also include market fixed effects, so highly persistent
unobserved demand conditions are accounted for. To control for medium term
fluctuations, I include the aforementioned six demand shifters as wells as two
variables measuring their rates of change.
With year dummies omitted for space, results are shown in Table 4.3.
Because the dependent variable here is RevPar, coefficients can be interpreted
as the effect on dollars per room per day.
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After controlling for quality and other factors, we see that affiliating
with a national chain is associated with an average premium of $5.78 of daily
RevPar. This represents a 27.7% premium, or roughly $120, 000 per year for
a firm with 50 rooms.
This chain premium is the average over the 11 years in the sample.
We can also look at how the revenue premium varies from year to year by
interacting chain with year dummies. If the chain premium results from market
power derived from low information, one might expect to see it decline over the
past decade as information available to consumers online has improved.11 The
results can be seen in Figure 4.3. The chain revenue premium, expressed as
a percentage, steadily decreases over the decade, from around 30% in 2002 to
about 15% in 2010.12 This decrease suggests the advantage to operating as a
chain is fading, and potentially is evidence that online reputation mechanisms
that have developed over the past decade are part of the reason why.
4.2.3 Switchers
There is an important potential sources of bias in the above analysis.
Chain affiliation may be correlated with unobserved factors that increase rev-
enue. This would be true, for instance, if chain hotels were more likely to be
11For background on the impact of search costs and consumer information on firm behavior
and outcomes, see [8].
12This result does not appear to be caused by increasing numbers of chain competitors, as
it is robust to different specifications that include the number of chain firms in each market,
the share of chain firms, and the full type distribution in revenue estimates.
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Figure 4.3: Chain Premium (%) Over Time
Note: this table presents the estimated chain premium as a % of total revenue after
controlling for firm and market characteristics. Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence
interval.
built on the best locations. This would cause upward bias in the estimate of
the chain premium.
Our concerns about bias in revenue estimates stem from the fact that
chain and unaffiliated hotels may differ systematically in unobservable ways.
Ideally we could measure the counterfactual revenues of the same hotels with
and without a chain affiliation. While this is impossible, 104 hotels do add
or drop chain affiliation in the sample period. Roughly twice as many hotels
add a chain affiliation as drop it. Here, I measure the effect of this change on
revenue in a firm fixed effects context. The econometric model for RevPar rit
that I consider is:
RevParimt = ximtβ1 + firmitβ2 + citδ
c +marketm + timet + ai + imt, (4.2)
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where ai is an unobserved, time-invariant determinant of revenue. Our con-
cern is that ai is correlated with cit. Because we observe switchers, I can
estimate a de-meaned version of equation 4.2 to eliminate ai and estimate
δc off the subpopulation of switchers. No firms that add or drop chain af-
filiation change their star rating, indicating that switches occur within fairly
well-defined quality tiers, rather than accompanying a significant change in
underlying firm quality. Along with superficial changes in branding, joining a
chain requires following a set of standardized operating procedures.
Results from this estimation are in column 3 of Table 4.3. Time con-
stant explanatory variables are eliminated, and most estimates are similar to
the previous results. The FE regression provides an estimate of the chain
premium of $4.35, lower than the estimate without firm fixed effects, but still
a substantial advantage. This is equivalent to a 21.1% premium or roughly
$95, 000 per year.
By adding dummies for the number of years before or after the switch
occurred, we can trace out the timing of the revenue boost switchers receive
and test whether the chain premium results from selection on a trend in un-
observables. This would be the case, for instance, if chains were dropping un-
derperforming firms or adding independent firms that had recently improved
their quality. If this were the case, a one year lead of the switch should pick
up this reverse effect and eliminate the estimated chain premium. I perform
tests of this sort in Table 4.5. In column 4, we see the coefficient on a one year
lead of joining a chain is positive but not statistically significant and when
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Figure 4.4: Chain Premium Before and After Switching
Note: this table presents detailed revenue estimates for firms that add chain affiliation
during the sample period. Dummies for the number of years before and after the switch
occurred are included in revenue regressions and the coefficients on those are presented.
Year 0 corresponds to the first full year after adding affiliation. Dashed lines represent a
95% confidence interval.
it is included the chain premium is $4.07 and highly significant. I show the
full set of leads and lags visually in Figure 4.4. Two things stand out: first,
there is no increase in revenue associated as firm approaches adding a chain
affiliation, and thus the chain premium is not just a product of national chains
selecting high quality firms to allow into their chain or vice versa. Second,
the chain premium shows up at its mean level immediately, it does not need
multiple years to phase in. This result is consistent with the chain premium
being caused by consumer information. Under that explanation, as soon as
the chain sign is raised, the advantage should go into effect.
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4.2.4 Sources of Chain Advantage
The previous section has documented that chains earn a revenue pre-
mium of over 20% after controlling for firm and market characteristics, but can
more be said about where this premium comes from? Theory suggests firms
might use chain affiliation to gain market power by credibly signaling quality
in low information settings. While it is impossible to observe how informed
consumers are, this theory does suggest a variety of testable predictions.
Two of these have already been discussed. If the chain premium re-
sults from poor information, it should be declining over time, particularly
since 2005, as online reputation mechanisms have developed and become an
important part of the hotel industry. This is indeed the case, as Figure 4.3
demonstrates, the chain premium is significantly lower at the end of the decade
than at the beginning. This result is robust to specifications of the competitive
environment and does not seem to be business cycle related. In Texas, during
the recession in 2008 many regions were still booming and the same fall in the
chain premium is seen in these areas as overall. If the chain premium were
driven by use of loyalty programs, for instance, we would not see this fall, as
loyalty programs have likely increased in importance during this period.
Additionally, if chain affiliation serves as a signal of quality, the chain
premium should appear immediately when a previously unaffiliated firm joins
a chain. Figure 4.4 shows that this is the case. If the premium were driven
by subtle improvements in quality or management, we would expect it to take
time to phase in. If the premium were just about the informational value of
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the name and sign it should appear immediately, as it does.
The next test relies on the theoretical underpinnings of the market
power argument. Typically, consumers and firms overcome the problem of low
information with reputations developed over repeated interactions. Chains
may facilitate this process by operating firms in different markets with uniform
standards of quality, increasing the potential for repeat interactions. The value
of a chain’s reputation should therefore depend on the number of potential
interactions consumers can have with it. This prediction can be tested by
interacting the chain premium with the number of outlets in that chain in
Texas. The theory predicts a chain premium increasing in chain size. Results
can be seen in Table 4.6. These estimates exclude independent firms. We see
a strong, significant correlation between chain size and the chain premium.
This lends support to the information based market power hypothesis of chain
success.
I also consider this effect using firm level fixed effects. In this case I
estimate the effect of chain size on firms that switch chains during the sample
period. For these firms the effect is smaller but still significantly positive.
There is a potential selection bias in both of these results, but nevertheless we
see that firms switching to larger chains see an increase in their revenue. Next,
I consider results from TripAdvisor.com customer reviews data. The number
and consistency of online reviews can act as a measure of consumer information
about different firms. While the number of reviews a firm receives is clearly
endogenous, as it is a function of the firm’s past history of demand shocks,
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Ratings by Firm Type
Note: This figure shows histograms of consumer ratings on TripAdvisor.com separated by
firm type, where firm type is either chain or independent, and stars refer to AAA quality
ratings.
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the mean rating and standard deviation of ratings are valid measures. These
data are inherently subjective, as consumers ratings may relate to their prior
expectations, treating 4 star firms differently from 1 star firms, for instance. So
long as they do not treat chain and independent firms differently, this does not
present a problem for any of our results. Table 4.7 shows summary statistics
on reviews, broken down by firm type and star rating.
There appear to be no systematic differences in mean rating, standard
deviation, or number of reviews between chain and independent firms. In Table
4.5, we see the full distribution of ratings aggregated by firm type. Reviews
are clearly not normally distributed, instead they are more likely to be drawn
from the extremes, with a large number of 1 and 5 star ratings. While there
are clear differences in the distributions between quality levels, within quality
levels chain and independent firms have remarkably similar distributions of
reviews. These results indicate that consumers do not systematically treat
chain and independent firms differently when rating.
While I cannot measure the effect of number of reviews on revenue
due to their endogeneity, we can still gain some information from them. I
re-estimate the chain premium for the subset of firms for which the number
of reviews is large. In Figure 4.6, I display the estimated chain premium for
a range of cut-off points. Below this is the number of firms of each type
included in the truncated sample. We see that as the number of reviews
increases, the resulting chain premium drops almost exactly to zero. This
suggests that as the amount of information available to consumers increases,
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the chain premium might disappear completely, although there is a potential
selection effect here as well. The most visited and reviewed firms could have
unobservable characteristics affecting this result. I test this by performing the
same analysis but truncating on traffic and number of rooms and I do not find
a similar pattern.
4.3 Recovering Costs
In this section I will describe the empirical strategy for recovering the
cost structure of the industry. Why are we interested in these costs? I have
already shown that organizing as a chain is associated with a significant rev-
enue premium. This suggests that market power plays a role in the success
of the chain model, but it does not give the full story. Whether chains also
derive an efficiency or cost advantage from their affiliation matters for how we
should think about them. If they do, and it is substantial, the implications
for social welfare are different then if the only advantage derives from market
power, and the implications for the future of the industry depends on whether
chains will continue to thrive if the premium they are able to charge declines
as consumers have access to greater information.
Unfortunately, these costs are not observable. Recovering them requires
a structural model. Estimating this model serves another purpose, as well, in
allowing for the counterfactual exercises used to consider policies restricting
chain firms.
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This methodology follows a recent tradition in empirical industrial or-
ganization of using two stage methods to recover the structural parameters
of settings of firm competition that can be characterized as dynamic games,
beginning with [2] and [4], extended more recently by [3]. These methods
have recently been applied to a number of questions in industrial organiza-
tion, including Environmental regulation ([42]), land use regulations ([45]),
production spill-overs ([24]), demand fluctuations ([16]), repositioning costs
([38]), and dynamic effects of Medicare hospital regulations ([26]). A good
recent overview of these methods is by [5].
The empirical strategy presented here begins with a model of the in-
dustry as a dynamic discrete game being played out across a number of local
markets. Firms decide whether to remain active in the market or exit, and po-
tential entrants must decide whether to enter or stay out, as well as what type
of firm to open. Firms base their decision on the expected discounted stream
of profits. By observing variation in their decisions across different types of
firms and different types of markets, we learn the value of being active and
how it varies over different states of the world. This value is the discounted
stream of profits. By subtracting observable revenues from estimated profits,
what remains are average per period operating costs. This approach essen-
tially takes observed revenues and observed entry and exit decisions and finds
the set of costs that best rationalize these two things. These are the costs
we are concerned with when considering the proposition that chain affiliated
firm’s success is due to economies of scale in inputs, advertising, technology,
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etc.
4.3.1 Model
I model the hotel industry as a dynamic discrete game, where in each
period firms compete against one another in local markets. The game is mod-
eled following [22]. Each market contains a set of actors, differentiated along
three dimensions: their quality type (1, 2, or 3 stars), whether or not they
are affiliated with a chain, and whether they are an incumbent or a potential
entrant.13 Each firm in each period chooses whether or not to be active in the
market and entrants determine their type.
Each market is described by a vector of state variables which deter-
mine payoffs. Denote the common state vector xit. This includes endogenous
variables, namely the number of each type of firm participating in the market.
Denote the number of firms of each type as {ncq, nuq} where q ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The
endogenous component of xit consists of a 6× 1 vector containing ncq and nuq .
The vector xit also contains own type and market characteristics such as traffic
levels.
In addition to this is, firms observe private information which they
use in making their decision. Specifically, they observe a private signal about
their profits in the coming year and use that signal in part when they decide
whether or not to stay active. This signal can represent demand conditions,
13Because there is such a small number of 4 star firms, and none enter or exit during the
sample period, I exclude them from this analysis.
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cost conditions, or both. This is modelled as a vector of one period, IID shock
to profits, defined as it(ait), where firm actions are represented by ait. For
incumbents:
ait =
0 if exiting1 if active (4.3)
For entrants:
ait =

0 if staying out
(1, c, 1) if entering as a 1 star chain
(1, c, 2) if entering as a 2 star chain
(1, c, 3) if entering as a 3 star chain
(1, u, 1) if entering as a 1 star unaffiliated
(1, u, 2) if entering as a 2 star unaffiliated
(1, u, 3) if entering as a 3 star unaffiliated
(4.4)
Time is discrete over an infinite horizon, and the timing is as follows.
At the beginning of each period, all active firms draw their private payoff
values it and decide whether or not to remain active in the market or exit
irreversibly. At the same time, a set of potential entrants observe the state of
the market xit and a draw of private values it and decide whether to enter
the market or not. If they do not, they are replaced by a new set of potential
entrants in the following period.
Once these decisions have been made, firms compete and earn rev-
enues R(xit, ait, a−i,t; θR) and incur operating costs C(xit, ait; θC).14 The vec-
14I choose not to model the stage game that generates revenue, instead taking revenue as
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tors (θcC , θR) parameterize the cost and revenue functions. Note that while
revenues depend on the actions of ones rivals, costs do not. The private infor-
mation component of payoffs is additively separable. Per period payoffs can
thus be written:
pi(xit, ait, a−i,t; θ) = R(xit, ait, a−i,t; θR)− C(xit, ait; θC) + (ait). (4.5)
At the time of entry, potential entrants jointly decide whether or not to
affiliate or remain independent, and which quality level to operate at. When
entering, the firm pays an entry cost, EC(ci, qi), that is a function of quality
and affiliation. For potential entrants, private information shocks help deter-
mine not just whether the firm will be active but also what type and quality
level they will choose.
Throughout this paper, all decisions are assumed to be made by local
business owners. Despite operating under the brand of a national chain, that
chain’s headquarters makes neither the exit or entry decision. This is how the
market operates in reality, with few exceptions. Hotels belonging to a chain
must uphold certain quality standards and pay a share of revenues or flat
franchise fee, but are otherwise independent.15 This also keeps the game much
a flexible function of firm characteristics, market characteristics, and the number and type
of competitors faced by each firm.
15In some cases, hotel chains do have centralized strategies with respect to entry, but the
focus of these is on “showcase” hotels in large markets. In the rural markets I focus on here,
the process is initiated and controlled by local entrepreneurs.
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simpler than if a central body was making entry and exit decisions across a
large number of markets.
4.3.2 Equilibrium
Following [22], firms’ entry and exit strategies are restricted to be
anonymous, symmetric, and Markovian. Firms thus only consider the cur-
rent state vector of payoff relevant variables when making their decisions and
all firms facing the same state behave the same way. Denote their strategies
σi : (xi, i) −→ ai. Given these strategies, the incumbent firm’s problem can
be summarized:
V I(xi, i, σi; θ) = max
ai
{i(ai = 0), i(ai = 1)+
Ea−i
[
pi(xi, ai = 1, a−i) + βEx′i,′iV
I(x′i, 
′
i, σi; θ)
]}
.
(4.6)
The value of being an incumbent in state (xi, i) is either the value of
exiting or continuing in the market, earning expected profits plus a continua-
tion value, whichever is higher.
The choice of firm type is made is upon entry. Thus, entrants face
a somewhat more complex problem. They make 3 decisions simultaneously,
whether to enter, whether to operate as a chain or independently, and at what
quality level. Let qi ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote quality level. The entrant’s decision can
be summarized:
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V E(xi, σi, i; θ) = max
ai,[c,u],qi
{i(ai = 0),
−θECc (qi) + i(ai, c, qi) + βEx′iV Ic (x′i, σi; θc),
−θECu (qi) + i(ai, u, qi) + βEx′iV Iu (x′i, σi; θu)
}
.
(4.7)
The value of being a potential entrant in state (xi, i) is the higher of
the values of staying out or entering as a chain or unaffiliated firm of any
quality level. Entering entails paying a cost that depends on type choice and
then becoming an incumbent firm in the next period.
These firm value functions are indexed by the strategy functions σ(x),
which firms use to forecast their rivals’ behavior and their own future behavior.
The strategies σ(x) form a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium if for all V (·)
above and all possible alternatives σ˜(x):
V (xi, σ(x), i) ≥ V (xi, σ˜(x), i). (4.8)
The presence of private information guarantees the existence of of at
least one pure strategy MPNE, as shown by [19]. There is no way to guarantee
uniqueness, however.
4.3.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section I discuss the variables and assumptions I will use to
take the above model to the data. Until recently, estimating the underlying
parameters of dynamic discrete games has been considered too difficult to
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be practical. The reason is that solving for an equilibrium of the game is
computationally demanding and must be done for every set of parameters
considered in solving a maximum likelihood problem. Beginning with [2] and
[4], however, two step methods have been developed to avoid fully solving
for equilibrium at every parametric evaluation. Instead, reduced form policy
functions governing entry, exit and type choice are estimated directly from
the data and are assumed to reflect equilibrium play. These are then used to
estimate underlying structural parameters of the dynamic games.
The strategy followed here follows this tradition. Reduced form policy
functions governing entry and exit are estimated and then these are used to
estimate choice specific value functions directly. Re-solving the firm’s discrete
choice problem using estimated revenues and future values allows us to recover
per period costs. In essence, I find the costs that best rationalize observed
revenues with observed entry and exit decisions.
4.3.3.1 Revenue Adjustments:
Two adjustments must be made to observed revenues at this stage.
First, I subtract franchise fees paid by chain affiliated firms. In the previous
results on revenue, I do not for these fees. In that section I am primarily
concerned with identifying and explaining a revenue premium earned by chain
firms and am not interested in how this premium is divided between the fran-
chisee and franchisor. In the current section I model the entry and exit decision
of the franchisee and so it is necessary to remove these fees. Fortunately, ho-
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tel chains charge uniform fees across members and these are collected and
published by Hotel Management, a trade publication. The standard contract
consists of a flat initial fee ranging from $50, 000 to $100, 000 followed by
7 − 10% of revenue thereafter. The fixed costs I estimate in this section are
thus the net costs before fees, or the underlying economic costs of operation.
I find that, on average, the chain revenue premium is split with around 50%
going to the franchisee and 50% to the franchisor via fees.
Second, I adjust revenue for selection on entry and exit. We only ob-
serve the revenues of firms who do not exit and model the entry/exit process
as a function of revenue shocks. Revenue thus needs to be adjusted for selec-
tion on these shocks. This can be done using a control function approach as
described in [21]. Specifically, continuing to assume the private component of
revenue is distributed according to a type 1 extreme value distribution, the
expected value of this for active firms is
E(i|xi, ai = 1) = γ − ln( ̂p(ai = 1|xi)). (4.9)
After making these adjustments, revenues are estimated mostly as de-
scribed in previous sections with two differences. First, for the purposes of our
second stage estimation, revenues are only estimated over the state variables
of the dynamic discrete game, i.e. no market dummies. Second, to keep the
specification flexible, I include quadratic terms on market characteristics and
interactions between firm and market characteristics.
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4.3.3.2 Policy Functions:
The first step is estimation of firm policy functions determining entry
and exit decisions. I assume the unobservable components i are distributed
according to a Type 1 Extreme Value (T1EV) distribution. Therefore, for
incumbent firms, the choice probabilities thus take the logit form where:
p(ai = 1|xit) = exp(xitβ)
1 + exp(xitβ))
. (4.10)
[2] show that under certain conditions, this Conditional Choice Probability
(CCP) is equivalent to the firm’s policy function. For entrants, the problem
is a bit more complex. Along with the entry decision, entrants are deciding
whether to operate independently or not and which quality level to choose.
Again I assume their shocks are distributed independently T1EV over these
alternatives, resulting in a multinomial logit problem.
For both entrants and incumbents, the state xit includes the full state
of the market, ie {ncq, nuq}∀q, as well as own type and market characteristics.
4.3.3.3 Value Function Inversion:
Here I describe how firm value functions are decomposed into revenue,
cost and continuation values and how these continuation values are constructed
using our estimates of policy functions. Because revenue is observable, once
continuation values are estimated, it becomes straightforward to estimate the
remaining piece, the firm’s cost function.
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First I give some notation. Denote the choice specific value function:
v(xi, ai) = pi(xi, ai) + βEx′iV (x
′
i), (4.11)
where V (xi) is the value of being in state xi before realization of i draws,
which I will refer to as the ex ante value function. I find it by integrating
V (xi, i) over the distribution of i.
V ≡
ˆ
V (xi, i)g(i)di. (4.12)
The model implies:
a∗i (xi, i) = argmaxai{v(xi, ai) + i(ai)} (4.13)
If I continue to assume i is distributed T1EV, then the probability of remain-
ing active is thus:
p(ai = 1|xit) = exp(v(xi, ai))
1 + exp(v(xi, ai))
, (4.14)
where the value of exit v(xi, 0) has been normalized to 0. [29], provided the
insight that specifying the choice in this way can allows us to invert the above
equation and write the choice specific value function as a function of estimable
choice probabilities:
v(xi, ai) = ln(p(ai = 1|xit))− ln(p(ai = 0|xit)). (4.15)
Using our first stage estimates of ̂p(ai|xit) from equation 4.10, I can
thus form estimates of choice specific value functions directly off the data. I
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can also use our policy function estimates to calculate the conditional state
transition function. Because private information shocks are assumed to be
independent across firms, the probability distribution of a firm’s rivals choosing
a−it is P (a−i,t|xt) = Πj 6=ip(aj,t|xt). Denote the transition of the state vector
F (x′i|xi, ai, a−i). The transition kernel a firm thus faces is:
f(x′i|xi, ai) =
∑
a−i
P (a−i|x)F (x′i|xi, ai, a−i), (4.16)
which can be calculated using our first stage policy function estimates and
estimates of transition processes for exogenous state variables.
[3] show how, due to the T1EV assumption on i, and due to the fact
that exit is a terminal state, the ex ante value function can be expressed solely
as a function of the CCP’s. The intuition here is that, because the probability
of exit is a function of the relative values of exit and remaining active, all
information about the value of being active is contained in the probability of
exit at this state. Specifically,
ˆ
V (x′i)f(x
′
i|xi, ai)dx′i = γ −
ˆ
ln(p(0|x′i))f(x′i|xi, ai)dx′i, (4.17)
where γ is Euler’s Constant.16 To simplify notation, I will refer to this item
as:
16For a full derivation of this, see [3]
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̂V(xi, ai) ≡ γ −
ˆ
ln(p̂(0|x′i))f(x′i|xi, ai)dx′i (4.18)
which I can estimate directly from our CCP estimates by simulating over the
distribution f(x′i|xi, ai) a large number of times and calculating ln(p(0|xi)) at
each draw. The choice specific value function in equation 4.11 can now be
written as
v(xi, ai; θ) = ̂R(xi, ai; θR)− C(xi, ai; θC) + β ̂V(xi, ai) (4.19)
The structural form of the discrete choice problem in equation 4.10 can
now be solved, offset with estimates of R̂(·), and used to find the parameters of
the cost function.17 The firm’s discrete choice is solved with fitted revenues in
the current state and the expected one period ahead value. This approach has
the appeal of being computationally straightforward, and thus can accommo-
date a large number of state variables which would otherwise pose a significant
computational burden.
4.3.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity
The preceding assumes there is no persistent unobserved heterogene-
ity across firms or markets. The reduced form estimates presented earlier,
17Specifically, since a firm’s choice probability is defined in equation 4.10, I re-solve a logit
model on firm type and continuation value, offsetting revenue estimates. While parameter
estimates in discrete choice models are typically scaled by the unknown T1EV dispersion
parameter, because revenues are observed in dollars, costs parameters can also be expressed
in dollars.
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however, provide evidence of both market level and firm level unobservables
influencing key revenue parameters. It is important, therefore, to allow for
this when estimating our structural model.
In general, it is difficult to account for persistent unobservable effects
in dynamic game models due to the highly non-linear nature of estimators.
[2] show a method for accounting for permanent unobserved characteristics
that influence payoffs in stationary dynamic games. [3] propose a method
for estimating models with potentially time-varying unobservable factors that
affect both payoffs and state transitions.18 This is the approach I follow here.
I assume markets are in some unobserved state s, drawn from a discrete,
finite support S. This variable can affect firm profits, firm choice probabilities,
and other state transition probabilities included in xit, such as traffic or pop-
ulation. The algorithm iterates over two steps. In the first, the conditional
probability of each observation being in each unobserved state is calculated
using data and the assumptions of the model. In the second, these distribu-
tions are taken as given, and parameters governing payoffs and transitions are
estimated conditional on them, treating them as weights.
In essence, in this procedure we are adding structure to what is unob-
served by comparing what our model predicts with the outcome in the data.
For example, if for market m, most firms in most periods earn revenues that
are higher than their predicted value, and fewer firms exit than our model
18Previous applications include [9] on the dynamics of retail competition and [15] on
worker productivity.
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predicts, it indicates this market likely has a high value of the unobserved
state.
These steps take place after finding reduced form estimates of policy
functions and revenues, and before constructing continuation values and solv-
ing the structural discrete choice equation for cost parameters. I describe each
step in detail below.
4.3.4.1 Expectation Step:
The first step is to take revenue and policy function estimates, and use
them to estimate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in each market.
Following [3], I refer to the first step the expectation step. After our initial
reduced form estimates of revenue and conditional choice probabilities, we for-
mulate the likelihood of observing revenues {rit : i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T} and
actions {ait : i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T} conditional on our estimated revenue
parameters βR, policy function parameters βa, and the assumptions of the
model.
The goal is to find these likelihoods for all potential values of the un-
observed state. To formalize this, denote the likelihood of observing firm i
choose to be active in period t in market m with states (ximt, sm):
lit(ximt, sm, β
a) =
exp([ximt sm]
′βa)
1 + exp(([ximt sm]′βa)
. (4.20)
Denote the likelihood of observing revenue rit in the same state as:
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Ω(rit|xit, sm, βR). (4.21)
Then the likelihood of the set of {rit} and {ait} in market m with state s is
Lm(sm = s) =
∏
i∈m
∏
t
[Ω(rit|xit, sm, βR)lit(ximt, sm, βa)]yit(1−lit(ximt, sm, βa))1−yit .
(4.22)
Here yit = 1 if the firm is active and is 0 otherwise. This expression
represents the joint likelihood of all the observations from market m in the
sample period, the revenues of each firm and each entry and exit decision,
conditional on that market being in state s. After calculating this likelihood
for each s ∈ S, we can calculate the conditional probability of being in that
state as
qm(s) =
L(sm = s)∑
sLm(sm = s)
, (4.23)
which follows from Bayes’ rule.
4.3.4.2 Maximization Step:
In the following step, the distribution of market level unobservables
qm(s) is taken as given and a new set of parameters of policy and revenue
functions are estimated using this distribution as weights. Here the unobserved
state s is treated as observed. The likelihood function for revenue, treating
unobserved states as observed, becomes:
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N∏
i
T∏
t
S∑
s
qm(s)Ω(rit|xit, s, βR), (4.24)
where Ω(·) represents the normal probability distribution function. The like-
lihood for incumbent firm policy functions is
N∏
i
T∏
t
S∑
s
qm(s)pr(ait = 1|xit, s, βa)yitpr(ait = 0|xit, s, βa)1−yit , (4.25)
where pr(ait|xit, s, βa) is specified as the logistic function. These likelihood
functions are then maximized with respect to βR and βI respectively. These
estimates are saved and the algorithm returns to the expectation step where
they are used to update qm(s) using the previously described procedure. These
two steps are iterated on until a fixed point in (βR, βa, qm(s)) is found. At this
point, the final stage estimation takes place, where cost function parameters
are found by solving the structural discrete choice equation, now using qm(s)
as weights. To briefly recap, the full structural estimation proceeds as follows:
1. Estimate initial revenue and policy function parameters (βR0 , β
a
0 ) using
flexible reduced form methods.
2. Generate initial distribution of unobserved states q1m(s) using equation
(4.23).
3. Using qm1 (s) as weights, estimate new revenue and policy function pa-
rameters (βR1 , β
a
1 ).
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 Repeat steps 2 and 3 k times, until βRk = β
R
k+1, β
a
k = β
a
k+1 and
qmk (s) = q
m
k (s).
4. Using the distribution of observables generated in the prior steps, esti-
mate final stage structural parameters.
4.4 Results
In this section I present estimates of firm operating costs as well as
estimates of entry and exit behavior. First, I discuss results assuming no
unobserved heterogeneity at the firm or market level.
For incumbent firms, I estimate a logistic regression, where the depen-
dent variable is whether or not the firm stays active, and the independent
variables are market characteristics, firm characteristics, and interactions be-
tween them. Reduced form estimates of an incumbent firm’s probability of
remaining active are presented in Table 4.9. I test a variety of logit specifi-
cations as well as probit and poisson. We see that chains and higher quality
firms are less likely to exit. Specification III, which includes quadratic and
interaction terms, is used in what follows.
Entry is modelled as a flexible poisson process. Entrants of each firm
type arrive at independent rates that vary with market characteristics. Re-
sults are shown in Table 4.10. While results differ across firm types, the two
strongest predictors of entry for almost all firm types are natural gas produc-
tion and interest rates. Markets whose existing firms are older on average also
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attract more entry.
I estimate county unemployment rate, total sales, and traffic as inde-
pendent AR(1) processes. These transition probabilities are used along with
firm policy functions to forward simulate and estimate continuation values at
each state. Once continuation values are constructed, I form equation 4.19 for
each firm. The unknowns in this equation are the parameters of C(·). I model
C(·) as linear in firm type and market characteristics. These are estimated us-
ing logistic regression, where fitted values of revenues and continuation values
are included. Results are presented in Table 4.11.
To correspond to our earlier measure of RevPar, costs are presented
in terms of dollars per room per day. They are robust across policy function
specifications.19 Bootstrap standard errors appear below in parentheses20. As
we expect, higher quality firms have correspondingly higher costs. Two star
firms operating costs are $4− 5 higher per room per day than one star firms,
and three star firms’ costs are $13− 14 higher per room per day. Fixed costs
per room are also decreasing slightly in number of rooms.
Most notably, chain firms have higher operating costs than indepen-
dent firms, after conditioning on quality. This result is consistent across spec-
ification and is statistically significant in 2 of 3 specifications. The costs are
19See Table 4.12 which compares the resulting cost estimates using different first stage
specifications of policy functions.
20These are determined by drawing whole market histories from the set of 353 markets,
with replacement, and repeating the full procedure described above 100 times.
90
higher by $3− 4 per room per day. If larger chains are better able to achieve
economies of scale, we would expect that operating in a larger chain would
result in lower costs. Interacting chain status with dummies corresponding to
chain size shows only weak evidence that operating in a larger chain lowers
costs. Across many specifications, these results argue against the hypothesis
that chains are successful because they are more efficient or productive than
non-chain firms. To gauge the accuracy of these results, on average, I turn
to industry survey data on costs. Smith Travel Research is an independent
research firm that operates a large database on hotel industry data, producing
annual reports on RevPar, gross operating profits and operating costs of ho-
tel firms. Their annual Hotel Operating Statistics Study combines data from
roughly 6,100 hotels in the United States. In Table 4.13, I present this sum-
mary data on average operating expenses for the limited service budget sector
of hotels.
The average reported daily per room operating cost is $31.00. For a
2-star chain firm, my estimates suggest an average daily cost of $33.41, $33.19,
$29.27, $32.92, depending on specification. The operating costs I estimate thus
fit very closely with average survey responses.
Results in the previous section show chain firms face slightly higher op-
erating costs than similar independent firms, but these results do not account
for unobserved heterogeneity. Its possible that chain firms locate in more at-
tractive but more costly markets, or have higher unobserved quality, and that
this quality is costly to achieve.
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Final results with market heterogeneity accounted for are presented in
Table 4.5. Results are for a qm(s) based on a uniformly spaced grid with 10
points. Increasing this number up to 100 was considered and showed little
improvement. Total average costs do not change significantly, and still match
up well with STR survey data, but we see that adding a market effect sub-
stantially changes the relative operating costs of chain and independent firms.
Previous estimates suggested chain firms had operating costs higher by $3.70
per room per day on average. This changes to $.20 per room per day, implying
chain and independent firms have no cost difference. This shows the important
effects accounting for unobserved heterogeneity can have on key parameters.
The implication of this change is that chain firms operate in more at-
tractive markets.21 The decrease in the chain revenue premium when account-
ing for market heterogeneity was also evidence of this. The results on costs
imply that locating in these markets results in higher costs, on average, and
not chain affiliation. That the cost difference between chain and independent
firms is so close to 0, however, suggests chains do not derive a significant cost
advantage from their affiliation.
21This is confirmed by regressing the share of firms belonging to chains on market char-
acteristics. This share is significantly higher in markets with higher traffic, business activity
and oil and gas activity.
92
4.4.1 Counterfactuals
Since the advent of chain retailers in the early 1900’s, their success and
the effect on independent firms has been controversial and calls for policies to
restrict their activities and “level the playing field” have been common. Today,
policymakers in a variety of locations have implemented or are considering
implementing restrictions on chain firms. The San Francisco, CA Planning
Code bans or otherwise limits chain firms from operating in much of the city,
and dozens of other U.S. cities have adopted similar measures. While they
have done so for a variety of reasons which I do not attempt to address here,
advocates for these policies almost universally cite worries that national chain
firms are displacing local, independent firms. Having estimated a dynamic
model, it becomes possible to examine this counterfactual directly.
The counterfactual question is what is the number of firms and dis-
tribution of firm qualities that would result if limitations on chain hotels in
Texas had existed over the past decade? In simulating the distribution of firm
types with limitations on chains, it is also possible to partially resolve the am-
biguous effects of chain expansion on welfare. Since there is strong evidence
that chains earn higher revenue after conditioning on firm characteristics, one
might think they have a negative effect on consumers. But this chain premium
is increasing in quality, and without the ability to signal quality that a chain
affiliation provides, fewer firms might enter at higher quality levels. Our model
allows us to simulate the distribution of firm quality without chains to test
this.
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Solving dynamic industry game models amounts to solving for a fixed
point of a large system of non-linear equations. This is too complex to solve
analytically and so must be done computationally. To do this I begin by
forming firm profits for firm types in all market states using the estimated
cost and revenue parameters discussed previously. I then solve for a fixed point
in firm value functions and policy functions using the stochastic algorithm of
[41]. Briefly, this algorithm simulates the model a very large number of times,
updating firm value functions with the true distribution of observed profits
and finding optimal firm policies. With firm policy functions governing exit,
entry and type choice, I can then simulate the behavior of firms in different
markets and consider the effects of different policies regulating firm conduct.
I start at the true firm distribution in year 2000 and forward simulate
11 years. I repeating this many times and for many markets as a policy
benchmark and as an informal test of the performance and fit of the model. In
Table 4.15, I compare the true 2012 firm distribution with the results of model
simulations and find that the model performs well, only slightly overestimating
the number of one and two star chain firms. I then test two potential policies.
First, a policy capping chain firms to be no more than 50% of the market,
and second, a policy banning all new entry by chains. I choose these policies
in part to avoid the question of how policies would treat existing chain firms
in 2000. This also keeps the counterfactual market structure closer to being
in sample while providing clear implications. The counterfactual firm type
distributions that result from these policies are shown in Table 4.16
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There are two notable effects of the policy changes. First, while there
are naturally fewer chain firms under the potential policies, there are also fewer
firms total. This is true despite there being the same number of potential
entrants in both scenarios. In the policy banning new chain entrants, the total
number of firms in the market falls by 1.03 on average. Second, this fall is
most pronounced in the 3 star category, where the mean number of firms falls
from 2.3 to .5. This is partially made up for by an increase in the number of
1 star firms. The same result is seen, albeit with smaller magnitudes, in the
policy capping chains at 50%.
Given the empirical results presented earlier, this is not a surprise.
The chain revenue premium is increasing in quality, and so the option of chain
affiliation increases the incentives of new entrants to open a high quality firm.
Restrictions on chain affiliation reduce both the total number of firms and
their average quality level.
4.5 Conclusion
The rapid growth of chains over the past few decades has attracted the
attention of policymakers and economists in a variety of fields. This paper
addresses the question of why firms organize into chains at all. It uses high
quality firm level data on chain and independent firms in the hotel industry
to test the main hypotheses of why chains are successful.
Reduced form analysis of firm revenues show that chains earn a sig-
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nificant premium, and that this premium is consistent with a model of low
consumer information. In particular, the chain premium declines over time,
appears immediately when a firm joins a chain, and is larger for chains with
more outlets. In addition, among firms with large numbers of online reviews,
the premium essentially disappears. Altogether the data support the view that
chain firms enjoy market power that derives from having a known reputation
in settings where consumers have little information about product quality.
In contrast, structural estimates of firm costs suggest chains derive no
efficiency advantage from their affiliation. They may even face higher oper-
ating costs than independent firms. The cost estimates correspond closely to
consultant’s estimates of operating costs from survey data, and are robust to
numerous different specifications. The evidence thus suggests that the growth
of chains in the hotel industry results from market power and not efficiency.
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Figure 4.6: Chain Premium, truncated by # Reviews
Note: The top chart presents the estimated chain premium in dollars on the y-axis, where
the estimates are on samples truncated by only considering firms with a minimum number
number of reviews, shown on the x-axis. The bottom table shows the number of firms in
each truncated sample.
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Figure 4.7: Growth of Chains in Rural Texas Hotels
Figure 4.8: Excluded Markets
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Table 4.2: Hotel Summary Statistics
Chain Independent
N 676 627
Rooms
Total 42,306 27,246
Mean 62.4 43.3
Min 20 20
Max 492 445
Mean RevPar
Total 32.07 19.07
1 star 20.36 17.44
2 star 28.82 24.04
3 star 42.21 34.08
4 star 44.00
Note: This table presents summary statis-
tics on hotel size and revenue per available
room per day (RevPar.) Star ratings are
based on the AAA Tourbook.
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Figure 4.9: Selected Market Characteristics
100
Table 4.3: Revenue Estimates
Pooled OLS Market FE Firm FE
Chain Status 6.450*** 5.973*** 4.347***
(.526) (1.009) (1.015)
#Competitors -.052 -.945*** -.964***
(.042) (.254) (.261)
Mkt Chain Share -6.626*** -9.189*** -6.639***
(.709) (2.178) (2.002)
Log County Revenue .291 3.718*** 3.888***
(.197) (.857) (.851)
Log Capacity -.043 -2.008* -18.519***
(.371) (1.081) (2.46)
Log Traffic -1.129*** .594 2.632
(.227) (1.348) (2.551)
Log Gas Wells .288*** -.125 -.211
(.066) (.421) (.612)
∆ Gas Wells 3.356*** 2.302*** 2.120***
(1.219) (.796) (.578)
Log Oil Wells -.030 .009 -.027
(.065) (.343) (.618)
∆ Oil Wells -1.924 -1.219 -.731
(1.334) (1.076) (.705)
Log Population .059 -3.574*** -9.725*
(.243) (1.233) (5.511)
Unemployment -.484*** -1.768*** -1.582***
(.099) (.479) (.418)
2 Stars 2.489*** 3.145* 8.998
(.684) (1.659) (17.642)
3 Stars 18.398*** 20.169*** 7.548
(.959) (3.346) (18.613)
4 Stars 41.569*** 33.691***
(2.834) (11.474)
1 Stars*User Rating 2.574*** 2.645***
(.169) (.494)
2 Stars*User Rating 3.309*** 3.393***
(.187) (.478)
3 Stars*User Rating 1.572*** 1.697**
(.235) (.768)
σ(Ratings) -7.459*** -6.669***
(.790) (1.962)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
cons 20.434 -9.973 101.560
(2.776) (12.677) (54.467)
R2 .32 .39 .76
N 12,807 12,807 12,807
Notes: The dependent variable is RevPar. Standard errors are in
parentheses, they are robust and clustered at the market level for all
specifications. All data is annualized and ∆ denotes the 1 year change.
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Table 4.4: Full Revenue Estimates with
Interactions
Specification I II III
Chain Status -10.55* .56 -.87
(5.49) (1.2) (1.40)
#Independents .78*** .73** .77
(.23) (.40) (.52)
#Chains -1.80*** -2.89*** -2.78***
(.17) (.264) (.35)
Log County Rev 4.16*** 8.23*** 8.17***
(.44) (.81) (1.12)
Log Capacity -1.98***
(.36)
Unemployment -1.96*** -2.22*** -2.17***
(.20) (.29) (.33)
Log Traffic 3.237*** 4.96**
(1.07) (2.74)
Log Gas Wells -.34 -3.52*** -3.56***
(.28) (.39) (1.13)
∆ Gas Wells 1.47* 2.302*** 2.120***
(.84) (.796) (.578)
Log Oil Wells .40 .009 -.027
(.36) (.343) (.618)
∆ Oil Wells -.43 -1.219 -.731
(.78) (1.076) (.705)
Log Population -2.05** 4.79*** -6.07
(.84) (1.12) (11.87)
2 Stars 25.86*** 5.34*** 4.21***
(5.37) (1.13) (1.32)
3 Stars 37.32*** 17.93*** 26.00***
(6.23) (1.32) (1.69)
User Rating 2.73*** 2.81***
(.12) (.19)
σ(Ratings) -6.61*** -9.03***
(.75) (1.25)
σ(Ratings)*Chain*1 star -4.37
(3.68)
σ(Ratings)*Chain*2 star -3.56
(2.26)
σ(Ratings)*Chain*3 star -7.59***
(2.63)
σ(Ratings)*Unaf*1 star -10.39***
(1.60)
σ(Ratings)*Unaf*2 star -11.55***
(3.06)
σ(Ratings)*Unaf*3 star -7.14
(10.33)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 .37 .36 .35
N 12,717 6,094 6,094
Notes: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market
level for all specifications. All data is annualized. #Independents
and #Chains refer to the number of each type of competitors the
firm faces.
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Table 4.5: Revenue Effects of Adding or Dropping Affiliation
Specification All Switchers C U U C U C U C
Chain Status 4.39*** .74 6.24*** 4.07***
(.73) (1.58) (1.08) (1.28)
Lead of Chain Status 1.82
(1.27)
# Competitors -.99*** .43 .08 -.93*** -.87***
(.11) (.60) (.42) (.11) (.11)
Market Chain Share -6.82*** -2.07 -9.78*** -6.75*** -4.51***
(1.09) (5.75) (2.70) (1.07) (1.02)
Log County Rev 3.62*** .63 7.98*** 2.30
(.32) (1.95) (1.20) (.32)
Log Capacity -18.84*** -17.45*** -16.25*** -18.19***
(1.06) (3.85) (2.51) (1.04)
Unemployment -1.69*** -2.64** -.32 -1.04*** -1.81***
(.15) (1.11) (.66) (.15) (.07)
Log Traffic 2.62*** -3.38 8.64** 2.52*** .36
(.97) (3.79) (.92) (.93)
Log Gas Wells -.15 1.41 -4.77*** .18 .08
(.22) (2.22) (1.24) (.22) (.22)
Log Oil Wells -.18 1.02 -6.74** .32 .45
(.51) (.40) (2.66) (.33) (.34)
Log Population -12.28*** 4.79*** -3.27 -2.81*** -1.18
(2.45) (1.12) (7.87) (.91) (.79)
2 Stars 1.67 5.77 -2.19 -4.10 2.71
(3.22) (13.30) (4.13) (3.73) (3.12)
3 Stars 9.48*** 2.02 9.22***
(3.55) (5.87) (3.49)
Years before switch:
5 1.42
(1.88)
4 1.05
(1.78)
3 .007
(1.72)
2 1.24
(1.68)
1 .40
(1.65)
Years after switch
1 4.06**
(1.82)
2 2.75
(1.69)
3 2.97*
(1.70)
4 3.77**
(1.73)
5 4.62***
(1.80)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .37 .36 .35 .14 .14
N 12,454 385 739 739 739
Notes: This table analyzes the effects of adding or dropping chain affiliation with firm fixed
effects. The dependent variable is RevPar. Specifications labeled “C U” includes only firms
that switch from chain to unaffiliated, and vice versa.
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Table 4.6: Chain Only Rev-
enue Estimates
Market FE Firm FE
Log Chain size 4.238*** 2.367***
(.251) (.595)
#Independents 1.516*** .807***
(.341) (.289)
#Chains -.732*** -1.038***
(.216) (.184)
Log County Rev 8.738*** 8.153***
(.554) (.460)
Log Capacity -9.490*** -22.930***
(.645) (1.877)
New Firm -5.145*** -8.446***
(.550) (.618)
Unemployment -1.832*** -1.839***
(.149) (.123)
Log Traffic 3.611* 2.301
(2.025) (1.677)
Log Wells -.387 -.464
(.438) (.389)
Log Population 11.158*** 10.494***
(.170) (3.677)
User rating 2.633***
(.170)
2 Stars 3.744***
(.786)
3 Stars 17.160***
(.819)
N 5669 5669
R2 .35 .17
Note: This table presents results on the sample
consisting only of chain firms. The dependent
variable is RevPar.
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Table 4.7: Hotel Reviews Summary Statistics
AAA Rating ? ?? ? ? ?
Chain
Mean # Reviews 13.25 16.14 24.99
Average Rating 2.72 3.18 3.79
Mean σ(Ratings) 4.30 4.78 11.78
Mean reviews per room .16 .25 .35
Independent
Mean # Reviews 13.28 13.82 35.27
Average Rating 2.93 3.04 3.70
Mean σ(Ratings) 4.53 3.72 16.58
Mean reviews per room .10 .22 .58
Note: This table presents summary information
on TripAdvisor.com consumer ratings taken from
a December 2012 cross-section, broken down by
firm type.
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Table 4.8: Estimated Slope of Reviews*Firm
Type
σ(Ratings) Mean Rating
Independent
1 star -10.39*** 2.66***
(1.60) (.28)
2 star -11.55*** 2.90***
(3.06) (.54)
3 star -7.14 .32
(10.33) (.67)
Chain
1 star -4.37 4.32***
(3.68) (.62)
2 star -3.56 4.35***
(2.26) (.31)
3 star -7.59*** 1.08***
(2.63) (.35)
N 6,094 6,094
R2 .36 .35
This table presents the interactions of firm
type and TripAdvisor.com ratings data. The
dependent variable is RevPar. Full results are
shown in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.9: Incumbent Firm’s Policy
Function
Specification I II III
Chain Status .360 .409 8.209**
(.330) (.331) (4.09)
#Independents .091* .024 .029
(.053) (.054) (.054)
#Chains -.032 -.015 -.014
(.038) (.038) (.038)
Log County Sales .017 -.103 -.644
(.105) (1.32) (1.37)
Unemployment -.065** .082 -.008
(.039) (.140) (.152)
Log Traffic -.282** 2.234** 2.056**
(.126) (.941) (1.020)
Log Wells .077** .128 .137
(.032) (.107) (.107)
Log Population .180 3.34*** 3.632***
(.136) (1.13) (1.143)
2 Stars 1.047*** 1.069*** 1.069***
(.347) (.346) (.349)
3 Stars .885** .893** .903*
(.409) (.411) (.413)
(Log Sales)2 .003 .018
(.032) (.033)
(Unemployment)2 -.010 -.006
(.008) (.009)
(Log Traffic)2 -.145*** -.136***
(.052) (.057)
(Log Wells)2 -.012 -.011
(.015) (.015)
(Log Population)2 -.149*** -.166***
(.053) (.053)
Chain*(Log Sales) -.556**
(.271)
Chain*(Unemployment) .187
(.127)
Chain*(Log Traffic) -.242
(.375)
Chain*(Log Wells) -.083
(.080)
Chain*(Log Population) .521
(.326)
N 12,270 12,270 12,270
R2 .04 .06 .07
Each specification is a logistic regression. The dependent variable
is 1 if the firm is active that period and 0 otherwise.
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Table 4.10: Poisson Entry Probability by Firm Type
Independent Chain
1 star 2 star 3 star 1 star 2 star 3 star
Demand Shifters
Log County Sales .744*** .111 -.119 7.235** .284 .190
(.23) (1.99) (.569) (3.68) (.41) (.29)
Unemployment -.104 -.070 .035 .228 .005 -.067
(.07) (.429) (.234) (.48) (.10) (.07)
Log Traffic -.033 10.152 .217 -.006 1.080* -.873***
(.28) (6.26) (.555) (1.59) (.63) (.32)
Log Gas Wells .247 3.632** .221 .199 .069 .899***
(.19) (.1.84) (.204) (1.23) (.19) (.21)
Log Population -.538 11.155 -.027 -29.389 .017 1.269**
(.44) (9.40) (.105) (18.12) (.75) (.54)
Interest Rate -.314** -1.359* .423 -.733 -.582*** -.848***
(.28) (.85) (.608) (.88) (.21) (.14)
Mean Market Age .168*** .047 .027 .134 .108 .228***
(.05) (.27) (.105) (.24) (.63) (.05
Number of Existing Firms
Independents:
1 star -.781*** 1.707** .173 .855 .440** .190
(.12) (.84) (.224) (.159) (.20) (.28)
2 star .492 -6.207*** .134 -2.208 -.859** .634*
(.32) (1.67) (.859) (2.61) (.38) (.30)
3 star -.880 -4.257 2.227 .335 .746 -.667
(.68) (3475) (.763) (.712) (.68) (.50)
Chains:
1 star -.220 2.416 -16.481 -4.826*** .250 -.193
(.41) (2.06) (2087) (1.65) (.49) (.35)
2 star -.255 -3.436*** .057 -1.978* -1.905*** .406**
(.20) (1.16) (.411) (.205) (.25) (.16)
3 star -.302** .495 -.515 .558 .544*** -1.074***
(.13) (.90) (.645) (.75) (.15) (.10)
N 2729 2729 2729 2729 2729 2729
Each column represents a poisson regression on the number of entrants of each firm type in each market each
year. Independent variables are market characteristics and the number of firms already in the market by type
of firm.
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Table 4.11: Estimated Operating Costs ($ per room per
day)
Constant 21.85*** 21.57** 21.97***
(6.23) (10.17) (8.95)
Chain 3.73* 3.70**
(1.93) (1.68)
2 star 7.87*** 7.87*** 7.84*
(1.93) (2.15) (2.53)
3 star 20.22*** 20.19*** 20.25***
(2.51) (2.43) (2.23)
Log(Capacity) .08
(.66)
Chain size < 100 4.62***
(1.88)
100 < Chain size < 200 3.11
(2.37)
200 < Chain size 3.67
(2.12)
This table presents final stage estimates of firm operating
costs, expressed in terms of dollars per room per day, with
bootstrap standard errors. Chain size refers to the number
of chain partners in Texas.
109
Table 4.12: Estimates Using Different
First Stage Specifications
Logit Probit Poisson
Constant 21.85 22.35 19.53
Chain 3.73 3.70 2.45
2 star 7.87 7.93 5.54
3 star 20.22 20.22 18.03
This table compares the results of fi-
nal stage costs estimation under dif-
ferent first stage specifications of pol-
icy functions. I model entry/exit deci-
sions as logit, probit and poisson pro-
cesses and solve the final stage using
each as inputs.
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Table 4.13: STR Operating Costs ($ per room per day)
Administrative 3.31
Marketing .64
Utilities 2.66
Maintenance 2.24
Total Operating Expenses 8.85
Franchise Fees 1.99
Management Fees .65
Property Taxes 1.99
Insurance .65
Debt Service and Other 14.18
Payroll and Related 7.97
Total 31.00
Notes: Data from Smith Travel Research 2012 Hotel Operating
Statistics Study, which compiles survey data from 3,593 limited
service hotels across the U.S. in the preceding year. Operating
costs are for limited service hotels in the Budget category.
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Table 4.14: Cost Estimates ($ per room per
day)
No Market Effect Market RE
Constant 21.85*** 22.57***
(6.23) (3.81)
Chain 3.73* .20
(1.93) (3.07)
2 star 7.87*** 7.16***
(1.93) (2.51)
3 star 20.22*** 19.16**
(2.51) (7.05)
This table compares final stage operating
cost estimates with and without controlling
for market level unobservables.
Table 4.15: Comparison of Model Simulations to Data
Firm Type True Firm Distribution Simulated Firm Distribution
Independent
1 star 3.89 3.74
2 star .49 .48
3 star .14 .14
Chain
1 star .10 .40
2 star 1.26 2.08
3 star 2.17 2.08
The left column is the distribution of firm types in 2011 in the data. The
right column shows the results of model simulation. For each market,
the model is started at the true 2000 distribution and forward simulated
10, 000 times.
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Table 4.16: Counterfactual Firm Distributions
Firm Type No Limit 50% Rule No Chain Entry
Independent
1 star 3.89 4.26 5.01
2 star .49 .49 .49
3 star .14 .14 .20
Chain
1 star .10 .09 .09
2 star 1.25 1.25 1.24
3 star 2.17 1.76 .28
All
1 star 4.29 4.35 5.10
2 star 1.74 1.74 1.73
3 star 2.31 1.90 .48
Total 8.34 7.99 7.31
This table considers the results of potential policy changes
on the counterfactual firm distribution. It presents the
mean number of firms of each type in each market, com-
puted over many simulations at many markets under dif-
ferent policy scenarios.
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